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Abstract:We take advantage of a unique natural experiment to provide new, credible 
evidence on the health consequences of scheduling birth early for non-medical 
reasons.In May 2010, the Spanish government announced that a €2,500 universal “baby 
bonus” would stop being paid to babies born after December31st, 2010. Using 
administrative data from birth certificates and hospital records, we find that about 2,000 
families shifted their date of birth from January 2011 to December 2010 (outof 9,000 
weekly births). The affected babies, born about one week early on average, weighed 
about 200 grams less at birth, and suffered a sizeable increase in hospitalization rates in 
the first two months of life, mostly for respiratory disease. 
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What is the effect of scheduling birth early for non-medical reasons on infant health? 
This question is hard to answer. The ideal randomized trial would be difficult to 
implement, since it would imply the scheduling of a randomly chosen subset of births, 
which may be questionable on ethical grounds. We provide novel causal evidence on 
this question by taking advantage of quasi-experimental variation, driven by a policy 
change in Spain that increased the incidence of scheduled births temporarily and 
exogenously. 
An increasing number of births are scheduled early for non-medical reasons in 
many countries.
1
 In OECD countries, cesarean-section rates have increased almost 
twofold in recent decades, from 15% in 1990 to 26% in 2009 (OECD 2011). In the 
United States, a recent article in the New York Times reported that more than half of all 
births are “hastened either by drugs or surgery, double the share in 1990”.
2
In the UK, 
about 25% of all births were induced in 2013-14, and 26%were delivered via c-section 
(Royal College of Obstetrics & Gynecologists 2016). Many of these inductions and c-
sections are not medically indicated (Engle and Kominiarek 2008, Mally et al. 2010). 
Conventional wisdom in the health profession appears to hold that more time in the 
womb doesn’t help the fetus once it has reached full-term (37 weeks of gestational age) 
and is estimated to weigh more than 2,500 grams.Many births are scheduled after those 
thresholds, but before the mother has gone into labor spontaneously, many of them for 
convenience reasons (for the families and/or the doctors).
3
There are two concerns with 
these early elective deliveries. First, scheduling a delivery even just a couple of days 
before the “due date” can imply bringing forward the date of birth by up to several 
weeks, given the uncertainty associated with the estimation of the “due date” and 
thenatural variation in the length of a pregnancy, which can vary by as much as five 
                                                          
1
 A birth can be scheduled via induction or cesarean-section. Labor induction consists of 
administering the pregnant woman certain hormones (prostaglandin, oxitocin) that trigger 
childbirth. Both inductions and c-sections can take place for medical reasons or electively. 
Elective induced labor can lead to an unanticipated c-section (Stock et al. 2012), so that the two 
procedures are not exclusive. 
2
 “Heavier Babies do Better in School”, The Upshot, New York Times 2014/10/12. 
3
 For instance, research has documented an unusually small number of births during weekends 
and holidays (Mossialos et al. 2005, Lefevre 2014), obstetric conferences (Gans et al. 2007), 
and inauspicious days (Lo 2003, Lin et al. 2006). 
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weeks (Jukic et al. 2013; only about 70% of women deliver within 10 days of their due 
date, Mongelli et al. 1996). 
Moreover, the association between gestational age and a range of infant health 
complications has recently been shown in the medical literature to persist across those 
thresholds (Madar et al. 1999, Clark et al. 2009, Lindstrom et al., 2009; MacKay et al., 
2010; Boyle et al., 2012), respiratory problems in particular.In fact, in the mid-2000’s 
the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists launched a campaign to 
eliminate early elective deliveries before the 39
th
 week of pregnancy, absent a clear 
medical reason (Buckles and Guldi 2016). In economics, a recent literature has 
documented strong associations between health at birth (proxied by birth-weight) and a 
range of long-term outcomes,
4
 associations not limited to children born below 2,500 
grams. 
Are we inducing too many babies, too soon? We address this question by taking 
advantage of a “natural experiment” that shifted forward the date of a large number of 
scheduled births for non-medical reasons, temporarily and “exogenously”. The natural 
experiment is generated by the pre-announced cancellation of a generous universal child 
benefit in Spain. In May 2010, the Spanish government announced that babies born 
starting January 1, 2011 would not receive the existing €2,500 baby-bonus. For ongoing 
pregnancies with a due date near the cutoff, the benefit cancellation generated an 
incentive to schedule the birth in December (versus January).  
We can view the decision to schedule birth early in the context of a model where 
parents derive utility from both consumption and infant health. The benefit cancellation 
represents an income shock, conditional on scheduling birth before the cutoff date. 
However, inducing birth early has uncertain consequences for the health of the 
newborn, given the lack of reliable causal evidence. Our results shed light on the sign 
and magnitude of this effect, which can help parents and health professionals make 
informed decisions about the timing of birth in the future. 
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 Including infant and adult health and mortality, test scores, educational attainment, 
employment, and earnings (Currie & Hyson 1999, Behrman & Rosenzweig 2004, Almond et al. 
2005, Black et al. 2007, Oreopoulos et al. 2008, Royer 2009, Johnson & Schoeni 2011,Figlio et 
al. 2014, among others). This literature can be traced back to the fetal origins hypothesis of 
Barker (1990), according to which low fetal growth would increase the risk of adult disease. 
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 We use detailed, high-quality administrative data from birth and death certificates 
and hospital records, for the universe of children born in Spain from 2000 to 2012. The 
simplicity of our policy change, the magnitude of the benefit, and the rich data allow us 
to estimate timing effects credibly and precisely. We first show that there was a 
significant spike ("bunching") in the number of births in late December 2010, with a 
corresponding "hole" in early January 2011. This is illustrated in Figure 1. We show the 
fraction of December births among all births taking place during the last week of 
December or the first week of January (panel A), for years 2000-01 to 2011-12. In 
“normal” years, about 50% of the turn-of-the-year babies are born in December. In the 
weeks surrounding the benefit cancellation, the fraction shoots up to 56%, a clear 
outlier. Our regression analysis confirms that about 2,000 births, or almost 6% of all 
January births, were shifted back to December in order to qualify for the benefit.We 
also find that the average shifted baby was born about one week early as a result. 
We show that the effect of the benefit cancellation on birth timing was more 
pronounced among college-educated, native mothers, as well as among higher-order and 
multiple births. The spike in December 2010 births was also significantly more 
pronounced in provinces with a higher proportion of private hospital beds, suggesting 
that the scheduling was more prevalent among families with access to private health 
insurance (i.e. of higher socio-economic status). These are roughly the same 
characteristics that describe families who schedule birth in normal times, which 
suggests that our results may have external validity beyond the sample of families 
affected by this specific reform. 
 We are also able to tease out how many of the switched births were scheduled c-
sections versus inductions. Our results suggest that both methods were used. We also 
find that the spike in December c-sections was driven by a switching of the dates of 
scheduled c-sections toward December, not by an increase in the overall incidence of c-
sections. This suggests that the health effects that we document are driven by time in the 
womb, and not method of delivery (although we cannot rule out completely that c-
sections have a stronger direct effect on health for shorter gestation babies). 
 We are then able to evaluate the short- and medium-term health effects of early 
delivery for the affected babies. Our identification strategy relies on comparing the 
health outcomes of all babies born close to the New Year of 2010-11, to those born on 
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the same dates in the surrounding years (before and after), using October and November 
as “control months”. By including both (late) December and (early) January births in 
our “treated group”, we control for any potential composition (or “selection”) effects, 
e.g. the possibility that only relatively healthy (or unhealthy) babies were shifted. By 
including October and November births as a control group, we also account for other 
factors that could have affected the health of all babies born in late 2010-early 2011.  
We find that babies born close to the benefit cancellation date weighed significantly 
less, as illustrated descriptively in Figure 2. We show the average birth-weight of all 
babies born in late December or early January (as well as late October-early November), 
from 2000-01 to 2011-12. There is a clear positive trend over time, but the reform 
period is again an obvious outlier, with average birth-weight more than 20 grams lower 
(Panel A) in December-January of 2010-11 than in the preceding or the following year 
(note that both affected and unaffected babies are included).Our regression results 
suggest that affected babies (those delivered early due to the benefit cancellation) were 
born up to 300 grams (9 percent) smaller on average as a result, to be expected since 
they were born earlier. We do not find a significant increase in the fraction of babies 
born below 2,500 grams, suggesting that the increase in scheduled births was driven by 
full-term pregnancies. This is confirmed by our analysis of weeks of gestation at birth. 
We are then able to follow up the newborns for the first 33 months (almost three 
years) after birth. We find that the affected babies experienced a sizeable increase in 
hospitalization rates, with almost 500 “too many” hospitalizations in the affected cohort, 
concentrated in the first two months after birth. Our most striking finding shows close to 
a 50% spike in bronchitis hospitalizations during the second month of life among babies 
born within one week of December 31, 2010. 
We are able to rule out several confounding factors that may have been responsible 
for the reported increase in hospitalizations, such as air quality or the flu season. We 
also explore the specific aspects of the policy change that could be driving the results, 
and conclude that the observed health effects cannot be attributed to hospital 
congestion, benefit receipt, or maternal stress. The most likely channel seems to be 




Our paper contributes to a previous literature showing that the timing of birth can 
react to economic incentives (Dickert-Colin and Chandra 1999,Schulkind and Shapiro 
2014, and LaLumia et al. 2015 for the US, Gans and Leigh 2009 for Australia, Tamm 
2011 and Neugart and Ohlsson 2012 for Germany, Brunner and Kuhn 2014 for 
Austria).Several of these studies (see Table 1) also assess the impact of changes in birth 
timing on health at birth (mainly birth-weight). 
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to provide credible causal evidence on the 
effect of scheduling birth for non-medical reasons on, first, health outcomes at birth, and 
then, subsequent health outcomes during infancy and childhood. We are able to link an 
exogenous increase in the number of births scheduled early to shorter gestational age 
and lower weight at birth, and then show how the affected cohort of babies was more 
likely to be hospitalized for conditions, such as respiratory disease, that correlational 
evidence in the medical literature has shown to be associated with gestational age 
(Escobar et al. 2006, Mally et al. 2010, Boyle et al. 2012). 
The uniqueness of our policy shock and the quality of our data also allow us to 
contribute to the previous literature in terms of the identification of the effect of 
economic incentives on the timing of birth, and the importance of announcement 
effects. We have a sharp and well-publicized reform that cut benefits by a large amount 
at a pre-specified date. Our policy is universal, and we are able to observe eligibility and 
the level of the benefit precisely, since it is only a function of date of birth and 
independent of family income. In contrast, some of the previous papers (such as those 
for the US, see Table 1) use cross-sectional and time variation in tax benefits, with 
varying amounts and no clean “control group”, and they have to approximate tax 
savings based on (few) observed household characteristics. In addition, the fact that we 
have detailed data with precise date of birth (unlike Schulkind and Shapiro 2014 or 
Brunner and Kuhn 2014, who only observe the month) allows us to focus on the days 
right around the cutoff, where the effect is most pronounced.  
In addition, our policy shock provided individuals with an incentive to bring the 
birth forward without affecting the timing of conceptions or fertility decisions (at the 
threshold), given that the benefit was announced only seven months in advance. Thus 
we can be reasonably certain that our estimated health effects are a result of the timing 
of birth, as opposed to conception. The birth timing effects found in previous studies, 
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such as Brunner and Kuhn (2014) and Schulkind and Shapiro (2014), are likely to be a 
combination of birth-scheduling and the timing of pregnancy, thus making the results on 
newborn health difficult to interpret. We share this advantage with Gans and Leigh 
(2009), but in their case the reform generated an incentive to postpone birth, rather than 
bring it forward. In terms of external validity, bringing birth forward is more relevant, 
given that the increasingly common practice of elective delivery can only shift birth 
forward, before the woman goes into labor spontaneously. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional setting and the policy change that generates our natural experiment. Our 
data sources are presented in section 3. Section 4 describes our results regarding the 
effect of the benefit cancellation on the timing of births, while section 5 presents the 
health effects. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional framework: The benefit cancellation 
In 2007, the Spanish government introduced a new, universal child benefit, which 
would pay €2,500 to all mothers right after giving birth, in a one-time payment. The 
new “baby bonus”was to be paid with the only requirement that the mother was a legal 
resident of Spain for at least two years prior to the birth of the child. The announcement 
was unexpected and the benefit was introduced retrospectively, thus generating no 
incentives for parents to manipulate the timing of birth (indeed, González 2013 finds no 
jump in the monthly number of births around the 2007 threshold). The size of the 
benefit was large, amounting to almost 5 times the monthly minimum wage of a full-
time worker, and more than twice the median monthly earnings of employed women. 
The benefit could be received shortly after birth (as early as three weeks later) if 
requested explicitly; otherwise it was deducted from the household’s tax liability when 
filing for income taxes corresponding to the year of birth (the following year).  
Three years later, the benefit was eliminated without warning in the first round of 
budget cuts as a result of the economic slowdown. There is no reason to believe that the 
benefit cancellation was anticipated. It was announced by the President in a hearing 
before Congress at his own initiative on May 12, 2010, together with six other budget 
cuts. The government had argued against budget cuts as recently as May 5, 2010. Even 
the opposition leader considered cuts improvised, and the media spoke of perplexity in 
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Congress. According to the national press, the measure was taken after a week of 
pressures from EU members and large drops in share values at the Madrid stock 
exchange.  The measure was approved on May 20, 2010 and ratified by the Parliament 
on May 27, 2010. 
The baby bonus would stop being paid for babies born after December 31, 2010. 
The announcement thus pre-dated the effective cancellation date by almost 7 
months.Crucially, none of the other measures announced at that time orafterwards 
would affect babies born in January 2011 differently from those born in December 
2010. 
The elimination of the child benefit could have had a range of short and longer-term 
effects. In particular, it may have discouraged fertility. However, any reduction in the 
number of conceptions would have led to fewer births starting 9 months after the 
announcement at the earliest (February 2011).
5
 For ongoing pregnancies, however, the 
pre-announced cancellation created an incentive for those with a due date close to the 
threshold to advancetheir delivery date in order to qualify for the €2,500.
6
No other tax 
benefits generated incentives to give birth in December rather than January, in 2010-11 
or the surrounding years.
7
 The “natural experiment” generated by the benefit 
                                                          
5
 Abortions could have reacted immediately to the policy announcement, leading to lower 
fertility as early as January 2011 (or even late December 2010). Women with a due date in 2010 
would have had no incentive to get an abortion as a result of the benefit cancellation. Given the 
uncertainty associated with due dates, we do not expect that abortions would generate selection 
in births right around the cutoff. However, in order to minimize potential bias generated by 
selective abortions, we focus on births taking place very close to December 31. We also test 
explicitly for fertility effectsin section 4. 
6
 There was a lot of discussion in the media at the time regarding this possibility. For example, a 
headline in the national newspaper ABC on December 30, 2010 read: “High-risk baby bonus: 
The end of the 2,500-euro baby bonus raises controversy about mothers seeking to advance 
births”. They interviewed a mother-to-be due in January 2011, who explained: “I think it’s risky 
to advance your due date, but I understand if a woman with a c-section programmed for 
January 1, 2, 3 or 4, as long as her doctor approves, asks to have it brought forward a few days. 
Given the current economic crisis, I understand that people consider it.” The article also quoted 
health professionals, with statements such as: “Advancing birth is (...) absolutely not advised, 
since it generates risks for the health of the baby.” 
7
There are two main tax benefits associated with children in Spain. First, a child tax allowance 
that increases with birth order, amounting to about €600 for the average family (which did not 
change over the time period we analyze). Second, a tax credit for working mothers introduced in 
January 2003, amounting to €1200 per year during the first 3 years of age of the child. Since it 
is prorated depending on the month of birth of the child, it generates negligible incentives to 
shift the date of birth (Azmat and Gonzalez 2010). We show that our results do not change when 
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cancellation thusoffers an unprecedented opportunity to evaluate the health effects of 
scheduling birth early for non-medical reasons. 
Maternity care in Spain is mainly provided by the publicly funded and run National 
Health Service, which is highly regarded with respect to facilities and personnel. 
Hospital choice among public institutions is permitted in several regions, though in 
practice it is usually based on proximity to the hospital. In the period under analysis, 
about 25% of deliveries took place in privately funded and run hospitals (Ministry of 
Health and Social Policy 2009). Mothers with private insurance (many public servants 
who may opt for private healthcare, as well as some affluent families) tend to give birth 
in private clinics in the absence of birth complications. Guidelines of patient care and 
average length of hospital stays are similar to the National Health System, but private 
hospitals show a much higher prevalence of c-sections,as well as births with obstetric 
intervention (including induction of labor, epidural, forceps, and episiotomy; Redondo 
et al. 2013, Escuriet et al. 2014). It’s been suggested that the high percentage of 
cesarean sections without medical indication in private hospitals could be due to their 
“greater receptivity to women’s demands” (Redondo et al. 2013).  
The standard recommendation is for new mothers to be discharged from the 
hospital 48 hours after births with no complications. In practice, the average birth 
hospitalization in the Spanish National Health Service is about 2.8 days for vaginal 
deliveries and 5.6 days for c-sections. 
 
3. Data sources 
We have two main sources of data. First, we use micro data from birth and death 
certificates from the Spanish National Statistical Institute. These population-level data 
provide detailed information on the universe of births and deaths taking place annually 
in Spain, as recorded in the official national registry. Parents are required to register the 
birth in a Civil Registry office between 24 hours and 8 days after the delivery takes 
place, by presenting the original birth certificate provided by the health centre 
(seeCasado, 2008, p. 56).The birth certificate is filled out by the hospital (not the 
                                                                                                                                                                          




parents) at the time of birth, and contains the date and time of birth, as well as the 
doctor’s signature. 
The variables included in the birth-certificate data come from a standardized form 
that families fill out at the time of registration, and include parental demographic 
characteristics, method of delivery, weeks of gestation at birth, birth-weight, late fetal 
death (fetuses with 20 or more weeks of gestation that die in utero, which we also refer 
to as stillbirths), and mortalityduring the first 24 hours after birth. There is no 
information on Apgar scores or congenital disorders.We supplement the publicly 
available files with the exact date of birth for each newborn for years 2000 to 2012, 
purchased from the Spanish National Statistical Institute. 
The death-certificate microdata provide information on date of death, age and sex. 
We also supplement the publicly available files with the exact date of birth. We 
compute mortality rates at the date of birth level as the number of fatalities in a given 
age range, divided by the total number of children born on each specific date (from the 
birth-certificate data). 
Our second data source is the Hospital Morbidity Survey for 2000-2014, which 
provides essentially an annual census of all overnight hospitalizations in Spain.
8
 This 
survey contains information, at the level of the individual hospital stay, on date of 
release, age (in years, months and days), main diagnosis, and length of the hospital stay, 
as well as some additional variables such as province and sex. It does not provide direct 
information on procedures, drugs administered, or costs. Diagnoses are provided at the 
3-digit level, grouped in 17 "chapters", following the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-9-CM). 
We construct the date of birth for each individual in the hospital data using the 
information on age and date of release, and select all hospitalizations for the cohorts of 
babies born on the relevant dates. We focus on child hospitalizations during the first 33 
months of life, given that the youngest cohort in our sample (January 2012 births) has 
not turned 3 yet in the most recent year of hospital data available (2014). We only 
include hospitalizations with an associated medical diagnosis, i.e. we exclude hospital 
stays for exploration, observation, or testing purposes (8% of all hospitalizations), as 
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 According to the National Statistical Institute, the data include 96% of hospitals in Spain, and 
99% of all overnight hospital stays. 
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well as the birth hospitalization of healthy newborns (not provided). We compute 
hospitalization rates (by age and diagnosis) for children born on a given date as the 
number of hospital stays (from the hospital data), divided by the total number of 
children born on that date (from the birth-certificate data).  
We also analyze maternal hospitalizations at childbirth, which serve as a check for 
the daily number of births as reported in the birth-certificate data (since more than 98% 
of all registered births in Spain take place in a hospital during the relevant period). 
Maternal hospitalizations are recorded in Chapter 11 ("Complications of pregnancy, 
childbirth, and the puerperium"). We select hospitalizations related to “normal 
delivery”
9
 (ICD-9-CM code 650), as well as those related to “other indications for care 
in pregnancy, labor and delivery” (codes 651-59) and “complications occurring mainly 




We focus our analysis on births taking place in December and January of 2000-01 
to 2011-12, with October and November as our “control” months in the health analysis. 
Table A1reports summary statistics for our full sample. The total number of newborns 
in the sample is 1,712,552. Panel A shows the health outcomes at birth, from the birth-
certificate data.Average weight at birth is about 3,200 grams, with less than 1% of the 
babies below 1,500 and about 8% below 2,500. Average gestational length is 39 weeks, 
and about 6% of babies are born prematurely (under 37 weeks of gestation). Regarding 
mortality, 3 in 1,000 pregnancies end in stillbirth, while less than 1 in 1,000 babies does 
not survive the first 24 hours after delivery. 
Panel B shows descriptive statisticsfor mortality rates by 2 and by 12 months of 
age. There are about 2.5 deaths per 1,000 births during the first two months of life, and 
about 3.2 during the whole of the first year of life. 
                                                          
9
 Delivery requiring minimal or no assistance, with or without episiotomy, without fetal 
manipulation (e.g., rotation version) or instrumentation (forceps) of a spontaneous, cephalic, 
vaginal, full-term, single, live-born infant.This would include some inductions, but not c-
sections. 
10
 We cannot separate birth hospitalizations precisely from other hospital stays surrounding 
birth, since we only observe the main diagnosis associated with each hospitalization. We can be 
sure that a birth took place when the main diagnosis is “normal delivery with no complications”, 
butwe cannot separately identify births with complications from other pregnancy-related 
complications shortly before or after birth. 
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Panel Cdescribes our infant health outcomes beyond birth, based on the hospital 
data. There were almost44hospitalizations per 100 births (by age 33 months). We split 
hospitalization rates by age, using shorter ranges at earlier ages. There are about 14 
hospital stays for 100 live births during the first week of life, about 3 at ages between 
seven and thirty days, and between 3 and 5 in the four following age ranges. Overall, 
there are almost 33 hospitalizations per 100 births during the first year of life, while we 
observe almost 11 hospitalizations per 100 births at ages 12 to 33 months.These 
numbers are comparable to those reported by the European Hospital Morbidity 
Database, according to which hospitalization rates of children younger than 1 
(excluding healthy birth hospitalizations) were above 30 per 100 births in many 
European countries in 2011.
11
 
The most common groups of diagnoses in our full sample (at the level of 
"chapter")are perinatal conditions
12
 and respiratory disease
13
, which account for 34 and 
24 percent of all hospital stays, respectively. We do not report hospitalizations due to 
perinatal conditions after two months of age sincethey are practically zero. Excluding 
birth hospitalizations (those for which the age at hospitalization is 0 days), respiratory 
disease is the top category (31% of all stays), and the most common three-digitdiagnosis 
isacute bronchitisand bronchiolitis (ICM code 466, more than 16%). The next most 
frequent diagnoses aredigestive problems and infectious disease. 
 
4.Effect on birth timing 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
In this section, we show that the benefit cancellation led to a substantial number of 
families scheduling birth early in December 2010. We interpret these results in the light 
of a simple model where parents value consumption as well as infant health, but may 
not be well-informed about the health effects of scheduling birth early (see Appendix 
II). 
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 For example, 40.5% in Austria, 31.2% in Finland, and 39.3% in Ireland 
(http://data.euro.who.int/hmdb/). 
12
 Chapter 15: “Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period” (ICD-9-CM codes 760-
779),which include “conditions which have their origin (…) before birth through the first 28 
days after birth” 
13
 Chapter 8: “Diseases of the respiratory system”(ICD-9-CM codes 460-519). 
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Our identification strategy relies on comparing the timing of births around December 
31, 2010, using the surrounding years as a benchmark. If the cancellation of the benefit 
had an effect on the timing of births, we expect to observe “too many” births in (late) 
December 2010, and “too few” in (early) January 2011, relative to the surrounding 
years. 
More specifically, we focus on births taking place in December orJanuary of years 
2000-01 to 2011-12 (including ten years before and one after the reform), and estimate 
the following regression: 
 
(1) Bjt =  + Dec2010jt + dw + dy+h + t + jt, 
 
whereB is the number (or the log number) of births taking place on day j of year t. Our 
explanatory variable of interest is a dummy for December 2010. We include a set of 
dummies for each day of the week (), as well as dummies for day of the year (), 
holidays (), and year (), the year dummies being in fact indicators for each 
December-January pair. We are thus controlling for fluctuations in the number of births 
associated with holidays or weekends, while the year dummies control for any 
aggregate factors, including the business cycle, possibly correlated with birth rates over 
time. Our full specification,which closely follows Gans and Leigh’s (2009),also 
includes interactions between year and day of the week.  
The coefficient of interest, , captures any “extra” daily births taking place in 
December 2010, compared with January 2011, and relative to the surrounding years.
14
If 
the benefit cancellation affected the timing of births, we expect  to be positive. 
We estimate equation (1) on four different samples. First, we limit the sample to only 
the seven days before and after the turn of the year. We expect most of the action to take 
place the days immediately surrounding the cutoff date. We then extend the window to 
two, three, and four weeks before and after.The fullsample thus includes all births in the 
last 4 weeks of December and the first 4 weeks of January, for the twelve December-
January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-12. We also re-do all of the analysis using only the 
five most recent December-January pairs, from 2007-2008 to 2011-2012.  
The number of observations in the full sample is 672(28 days, times 2 months, times 
12 years). There were on average 1,228 births per day according to the birth-certificate 
                                                          
14
 Since we have day of the year dummies, no December dummy is needed. 
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data, with a minimum of 806 and a maximum of 1,683 (reached on December 21, 2011, 
ten days before the benefit cancellation). 
 
4.2 Birth timing results 
We start by providing some graphical evidence on the impact of the benefit cancellation 
on the timing of births. Figure 3(panel A) displays the weekly number of registered 
births in Spain during the last six weeks and the first four weeks of the year, for2008-09, 
2009-10, 2010-11 (the reform period), and 2011-2012.The number of births in the first 
three weeks of December 2010 tracks very closely the figures for 2009, while births 
shoot up in the fourth and particularly the last week of December 2010, dropping 
dramatically right after the turn of the year.The drop in the number of births between the 
last week of December and the first week of January, which is about 200 births in 
“normal” years, increased to more than 2,000 surrounding the benefit cancellation. 
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the difference in the weekly number of births between the 
benefit cancellation year and the average of the three surrounding ones. Again, there are 
many more births than usual in the last two weeks of December 2010, and too few in the 
first week of January 2011. These numbers suggest that there was probably some 
shifting of births from early January 2011 to late December 2010. 
The daily number of births in December and January, for the reform year as well as 
the previous one, can be seen in Figure A1. In 2009-10, the number of daily births 
fluctuated between 1,100 and 1,500, with a minimum of 999 on December 25 and a 
maximum of 1,540 on December 29. There are fewer births during weekends, especially 
Sundays. It is easy to see that in the reform year, the number of births was unusually 
high during the last two weeks of December, reaching almost 1,700 on some days 
(except for Sundays, which remained around 1,100), while there were clearly “too few” 
births during the first two weeks of January, reaching a minimum at 877 on January 2. 
All Sundays in January 2011 were lower than usual, with around 1,000 births. 
We now formalize these observations with our regression analysis. Table 2shows the 
results of estimating equation (1) on the four samples, extending the window from one 
to four weeks before and after the cutoff date for benefit eligibility.The first column 
includes only the 7 days before and after the cutoff, thus the number of observations is 
14 days times 12 years (N=168).  
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The first panel is estimated using birth-certificate data.The results in the first row 
suggest that there were 290“extra” daily births in the last week of December 2010. The 
coefficient is estimated with high precision, and it translates into more than 1,000 births 
shifted from January to December.
15
 The second row uses the natural log of the number 
of births as a dependent variable, and it estimates that about 12% of births were shifted 
from the first week of January to the last week of December 2010. 
The second column in Table 2 expands the window to two weeks before and after 
the cutoff date. The daily number of “extra” December births goes down, suggesting 
that most of the shifting took place within the 14 days around the cutoff, but the 
estimated total number of births moved increases to 1,484. This indicates that some 
births may have beenshifted by more than one week. Once we include all four weeks 
before and after (last column), we estimate that about 2,050births were shifted from 
January 2011 to December 2010, or about 6% of all January births. 
The second panel of Table 2 uses as a dependent variable the daily number of births, 
estimated from birth-related maternal hospitalizations, in the hospital register data. The 
estimated effects are close to the results using birth-certificate data in the first panel. 
The coefficients are larger in the one-week window sample, and somewhat smaller in 
the four-week window, although the 95% confidence intervals overlap. Birth-related 
hospitalizations may include some hospital stays of pregnant women close to their 
delivery date that do not result inbirth. Our results suggest that part of the spike in late 
December 2010 maternal hospitalizations may have been unsuccessful attempts to 
deliver early. The results indicate that between 1,175 and 1,740 births were moved from 
January 2011 to December 2010 as a result of the benefit cancellation. 
Faking of the date of birth in the birth certificate seems unlikely to be driving our 
results. First, the spike in births in December 2010 did not take place exactly on 
December 31-January 1, but was instead quite spread over the two weeks before and 
after (see Figure A1). Additionally, our results in panel B of Table 2 using maternal 
hospitalization data confirm the results from panel A using birth certificate data, and it 
would have been harder to fake hospitalization dates in the hospital records. 
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We calculate the total number of births moved by dividing the baby bonus coefficient by 2, 
because a birth that is moved from January to December reduces the number of January births 
by 1, and increases the number of December births by 1, so that it is "counted twice". We then 
multiply it bythe number of days pre-cutoffin the corresponding window (7 in this case). 
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The results are not overly sensitive to the set of dummy variables included as 
controls. Table A2 in the appendix shows the results of several alternative specifications 
for the one-week window sample. The estimated number of births moved fluctuates 
only between 980 and 1015 (11-12%) in Panel A. We also re-estimate the regressions 
using only three years before and one year after as controls (see Table A3), with the 
point estimates and significance levels essentially unchanged. 
Our estimated timing effect is in the same order of magnitude as those in previous 
studies of other reforms in different countries. In Table 1, we report the estimated 
percentage-point shift in the number of births as a result of $1,000 in benefit or tax 
incentives, across different studies.We find almost a 2 percentage point increase in the 
probability of a (last week of) December birth with respect to a (first week of) January 
birth. The analyses of similarly well-publicized reforms in other countries lead to 
estimated effects of similar magnitude, such as the Tamm (2012) study for Germany 
(1.8 points) or the ones for Austria (Brunner and Kuhn 2014) and Australia (Gans and 
Leigh 2009). LaLumia et al. (2015) find a smaller effect for the case of the US (about a 
1-point increase), but they acknowledge that the tax benefits of a December versus a 
January birth are not well known. 
 The dynamics of the shifting of births are better appreciated when we estimate the 
regression described in equation (1), but instead of a single December 2010 dummy, we 
include four dummies for the last 4 weeks of December 2010, as well as four dummies 
for the initial 4 weeks of January 2011.The sample now is extended to include all births 
from November 27 to February 4 of the twelve years, i.e. 5 weeks before and after the 
cutoff. Thus, the reference period includes the week of November 27 to December 3, as 
well as January 29-February 4. 
The results of these specifications are reported in Table 3 (first two columns). It 
appears that the “extra” December births took place during the last three weeks of the 
year (especially the very last), while there were significantly “too few” births extending 
up to the fourth week of January. We also extend the analysis to 6 and 8 weeks before 
and after the turn of the year, with similar conclusions (columns three to six).  
The fact that the reduced number of births extends late into January suggests that 
there was probably some within-January shifting as a result of the benefit cancellation. 
Since the first week of the year was particularly “empty” because of the shifting to late 
16 
 
December, births that would have been scheduled for later in January may have been 
moved forward, thus generating ripple effects in the following weeks.It is also possible 
that the low number of births in late January and early February reflect a (negative) 
fertility effect of the benefit cancellation, since a new conception right after the 
announcement of the benefit cancellation (on May 12, 2010) would have February 2, 
2011 as the estimated due date.We test explicitly for fertility effects in Table A4, and 
find no evidence of an effect before the fourth week of January 2011.
16
For this reason, 
when describing our health results we focus on the three-week window around the 
benefit cancellation date. 
Our results from Table 3 imply that the average birth in our sample (all births in 
December and January) was shifted by almost 0.08 weeks.
17
 In other words, gestational 
length at birth was 0.08 weeks shorter for the cohort of babies born around the benefit 
cancellation date (within four weeks before or after). We calculate that between 1,975 
and 2,120 births were shifted from January to December as a result of the benefit 
cancellation.
18
These estimates imply, in turn, that the average affected baby was born 
about 2.5 weeks earlier as a result.
19
However, this should be interpreted as an upper 
bound since, as mentioned, the benefit cancellation may have led to additional shifting 
within January (and/or December), and to fewer births due in early February. If we 
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 We find evidence consistent with a drop in fertility starting the last week of January (a 
negative significant coefficient in the 4-week window sample). 
17
 0.077 = [(5.3·(-4) + 48.3·(-3) + 66.1·(-2) + 162.3·(-1) + (-119.8)·0 + (-74.0)·1 + (-66.2)·2 + (-
43.1)·3)·7]/72,771. Each coefficient (in the first column of Table 3) estimates the daily number 
of "extra" December births or "missing" January births, by week. For instance, the coefficient 
5.3 tells us that there were about 5 "too many" daily births in the first week of December 2010. 
We multiply the daily effects implied by each coefficient by 7 since there are 7 days per week, 
and by their distance to the threshold (in weeks). This gives us the total number of weeks 
shifted. We then obtain the average number of weeks shifted by dividing the previous figure by 
the total number of births in the relevant eight-week sample for 2010-11(72,771). 
18
 We calculate the total number of births shifted from January to December by adding up the 
daily extra births in each of the weeks in December (given by the baby bonus coefficients for 
each week in Table 3), and multiplying by the number of days per week (7). From the first 
column of Table 3, 1,975 = (5.32+48.35+66.13+162.30)·7; and from the third column of Table 
3, 2,120 = (23.94+2.28+5.33+63.11+ 159.28)·7. 
19
 From the first column of Table 3, the estimated number of births shifted from January to 
December is 1,975. We obtain the fraction of affected babies by dividing over the total number 
of births in the eight relevant weeks (1,975/72,771=0.03). Thus, the number of weeks that each 
affected child would have been moved is the estimated average number of weeks moved (0.076, 
from the first column of Table 3) divided by the fraction of affected babies: 0.076/0.03=2.5. 
17 
 
assume that as many births were shifted within December or January as between, then 
the estimated effect on the affected babies would be half the size, about 1.2 weeks (9 
days). The true average effect on “affected” newborns may be even lower if fertility 
effects were also present. 
 In order to get a better understanding of the effects on gestational age at birth,were-
estimate equation (1) for the number of daily births, now split by weeks of gestation at 
birth.
20
 The most common gestational age at birth is 40 weeks (30% of all births in our 
sample), followed by 39 weeks (23%). There is also a substantial fraction of births 
before the 37
th
 week (pre-term births, about 6%, see Table A1). These regression results 
are presented in Table A5 (Panel A). They show that the vast majority of the “extra” 
December births were full-term.The largest increase is found for 39-40 weeks of 
gestation, with a large effect also for weeks 37-38. Medical guidelines in Spain at the 
time advised against inducing birth before the 37
th
 week unless specific maternal or 




We also estimate a version of equation (1) at the individual birth level, where the 
outcome variable is reported weeks of gestation at birth.
22
 These results are reported in 
Panel B of Table A5. The estimated effects on average weeks of gestation (between 
0.025 and 0.051) are significant, although smaller than those in Table 3 (0.077), 
suggesting that the average affected birth was shifted by between half and one week.
23
 
Our gestational age variable is based on the reported date of the mother’s last menstrual 
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 There are about 15% missing observations for weeks of gestation in our sample. We have 
verified that the missing status is not significantly different in the dates close to the benefit 
cancellation (results available upon request). 
21
 These guidelines have been updated and now advise against elective c-sections before week 
39 (Sociedad Española de Ginecología y Obstetricia2015). 
22
 We estimate the following regression: 
Weeksit =  + Dec2010it + φXitdw dy h + t + it, 
where the dependent variable is weeks of gestation at birth, and the explanatory variable of 
interest is a dummy for December 2010 births. We control for demographic characteristics X, 
province fixed-effects,dummies for day of the week (), day of the year (), holidays (), year 
dummies t (indicators for each December-January set), and interactions between year and day 
of the week. 
23
 We calculate the effect on the births that were actually shifted by dividing the coefficient by 
the estimated fraction of affected births.Using the coefficient in the last column, -
0.025/0.027=0.92 weeks (upper bound). The lower bound would be half this size, 0.46 weeks. 
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period, so that it is likely subject to some measurement error (Lynch and Zhang 2007, 
Hall et al. 2013). Moreover, gestational age in weeks will likely miss some shifts in 
timing of less than one week. In any case, the 95% confidence intervals for our 
estimated effect on weeks of gestation (in the +/- 4 weeks sample) in Tables 3 and A5 
overlap, so that the results using the two different methods are statistically 
indistinguishable. 
Overall, we find strong evidencethat a significant number of births were shifted from 
January 2011 to December 2010 (almost 6% of all monthly births) as a result of the 
benefit cancellation, with important effects on gestational age at birth for the affected 
newborns (about one week). 
 
4.3 Who was affected? 
In order to identify the types of families that were more likely to react to the benefit 
cancellation, we estimate birth timing regressions at the individual level allowing for 
heterogeneous effects, i.e. interacting the reform variable with a range of family 
characteristics. We take the sample of December-January births for the twelve years of 
data, and estimate the following specification, adapted from Dickert-Colin and 
Chandra’s (1999) and Schulkind and Shapiro’s (2014): 
 
(2) Dec birthit= + (Dec2010-Jan2011)it + (Dec2010-Jan2011)Xit +φXit+t 
 
The dependent variable is binary, taking value 1 if birth i in December-January pair t 
took place in December, and 0 for January births. We expect this variable to be about 
0.5 in non-reform years, which is in fact the case, as shown in Figure 1. The main 
explanatory variable, Dec2010-Jan2011, takes value 1 for the reform period, December-
January of 2010-11. A positive would indicate that there were too many December 
(versus January) births in 2010-11, compared with the surrounding years. 
Demographic characteristics Xit include: mother’s age, mother’s immigrant status 
and marital status, dummies for urban and rural areas, dummies for first-borns, female 
babies, and multiple births, an indicator for babies with no registered father, and a 
dummy for mothers in high-skill occupations.
24
Since 2007, we can also include 
educational attainment of the parents. We also include a linear time trend. The γ 
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 We also control for province fixed-effects. 
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coefficientscapture the differential impact of the reform for different demographic 
groups. 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (2) for the four samples 
progressively widening the window around the cutoff date. We show the results for the 
short sample(years 2007-08 to 2011-12), where we can control for education (the results 
are similar for the full sample). The baseline model reports the results of a benchmark 
regression with the demographic controls but no interactions. We confirm the results 
from section 4.2 that the benefit cancellation induced a shifting of births from January 
2011 to December 2010. The first specification shows that, if we focus on the 14 days 
closest to the turn of the year, the fraction of December births was more than 5 
percentage points too high in 2010-11, as illustrated graphically in Figure 1. 
The model with interactions shows the results from the regression that interacts all 
the control variables with the reform dummy. The results for the one-week window 
show thatfirst births were 3 percentage points less likely to be re-scheduled. The shifting 
appears less common among immigrant mothers (by more than 2 points). We also find 
that university-educated parents were more likely to react to the policy change, while a 
large (if imprecisely estimated) impact is found for multiple births. The interaction with 
occupation of the mother is not significant. We also try specifications that include an 
additional interaction with occupation of the father, which is found to be insignificant. 
These results suggest that the scheduling of births in order to receive the benefit 
was not driven by women with low socio-economic status, but by relatively educated, 
non-immigrant women, with previous children or expecting multiples. Previous work 
has documented a higher incidence of c-sections, which are often scheduled, among 
older women, higher-order births, and multiple births (Lalumia et al. 2013, Aron et al. 
1998, Patel et al. 2005). Thus, our findings suggest that at least some of the shifting 
most likely comes from deliveries that would have been scheduled in any case (see next 
subsection). These results also indicate that the types of women who shifted their 
delivery date in response to the benefit cancellation are similar to the women who are 
likely to schedule a birth in normal times, which suggests that our results may have 
some external validity. 
Higher socio-economic status families are more likely to hold private health 
insurance in Spain (Costa andGarcía 2003), and it is possible that private health centres 
20 
 
were more prone to scheduling births at the parents’ request, compared with public 
hospitals. In fact, c-section rates tend to be much higher in private than in public 
hospitals in Spain (37 versus 22% in 2009).
25
 
The birth certificate data do not contain information on the type of health center 
where each birth takes place. However, we obtained information from an independent 
data source (the National Catalogue of Hospitals, 2000-2012, from the Spanish Health 
Ministry) on the number of beds in private clinics across the 52 Spanish provinces and 
over time. If the shifting took place mostly among women giving birth in private 
hospitals, we expect to see more action in the provinces with more private hospital beds. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we re-estimate equation (2), including the 
interactions between the reform variable and the controls. We control for a new variable 
measuring the availability of private hospital beds in each province, and an interaction 
of the reform variable with the availability of private hospitals.
26
We 
use three alternative measures of the presence of private hospitals in a province: the 
number of private beds at maternity and child hospitals per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44, 
the number of private beds per 1,000 population, andthe number of private hospital beds 
as a fraction of all hospital beds. We cluster standard errors by province. The results are 
reported in Table A6. 
We find that the spike in December 2010 births was significantly more pronounced 
in provinces with a higher availability of private hospital beds, even after controlling for 
province fixed-effects and interactions between the reform and individual 
characteristics. The results in the third rowsuggest that a province in the 75
th
 percentile 
of private hospital beds (about 40%) had a spike in December 2010 births about 2.4 
percentage points higher than a province in the 25
th
 percentile (12% of private hospital 
beds). These results are consistent with private hospitals being more willing to adjust 
the date of birth on parental request. 
 
4.4 Timing versus method of delivery 
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 Source: Spanish Ministry of Health. See also Redondo et al. (2013). In a context of public, 
universal healthcare, lower rates of c-sections in public hospitals in Spain are consistent with the 
lower incidence of c-sections among the uninsured in the US (Aron et al., 2000). 
26
 In Spain private hospitals can be privately owned and operated, or privately owned, but 
dependent on the National Health System. We run the analysis with the two alternative 
definitions of private hospitals. The results are similar. 
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The delivery date for a pregnant woman can be shifted forward medically either by 
inducing birth or via a programmed c-section. While shifting the date of birth will affect 
the maturation of the fetus at birth, which can in turn affect health, delivery method may 
have direct effects on infant health.
27
 In this section we analyze whether the shifting of 
births that we observe was driven by an increase in the overall incidence of inductions 
and c-sections, versus a shifting of dates for births that would have taken place via these 
procedures in any case. We thus shed light on the extent to which any effects on infant 
health can be traced to method of delivery versus time in the womb.  
Our birth-certificate data do not provide direct information on whether each birth 
was induced. We do observe c-sections, but only starting in 2007. About 22% of all 
births in our birth-certificate data were cesarean sections. We supplement the analysis of 
c-sections from the birth certificate data with an analysis of birth-related maternal 
hospitalizations from the Hospital Morbidity Survey.  
We first estimate equation (1), using the daily number of c-sections as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient of interest captures any “extra” c-sections in December 2010 
relative to January 2011, using the surrounding years as controls. This estimate of the 
spike in c-sections in December 2010 includes both procedures that were re-scheduled 
from January to December due to the benefit, and any scheduled c-sections that would 
have been spontaneous vaginal births in the absence of the benefit cancellation (i.e. both 
“switched” and “extra” c-sections). 
The resultsare presented inTable 5. We detect significantly “too many” daily c-
sections in late December 2010; about 120 per day when we focus on the one-week 
window (panel A). Tables 2 and A3 show that the total increase in the number of 
deliveries in the last week of December 2010 was close to 280 per day (panel A), so that 
c-sections would account for almost half of the overall spike in December 2010 births. 
We run parallel regressions using data from maternal hospitalizations. All c-section 
births are counted as hospitalizations for “complications during pregnancy, labor and 
delivery”. The first row of panel B in Table 5 shows that the number of births with 
“complications” was significantly higher in December 2010 compared to January 2011. 
The magnitude of the coefficients (compared with panel B of Table 2) suggests again 
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 Jensen and Wüst (2014), for instance, find evidence of positive health effects of planned c-
sections versus inductions for breech babies.  
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that a large fraction of the shifted births were c-sections.We also find (last three rows of 
panel B in Table 5) that maternal hospitalizations in December 2010 were significantly 
longer.  
We then try to assess whether there were any “extra” c-sections as a result of the 
benefit cancellation, versus just “switching” of births that would have taken place via c-
section even in the absence of the reform. In order to do so, we turn to equation (3), 
which is estimated on the individual-level sample of births, including October and 
November as additional, control months.  
 
(3) C-sectionit =  + Dec-Jan)itDec2010-Jan2011)it + Xit + t + t, 
  
The dependent variable is now an indicator of c-section births, and the explanatory 
variable of interest is a dummy for December 2010 or January 2011 births, so that any 
switching of scheduled deliveries from January 2011 to December 2010 is not captured, 
and only “extra” c-sections would lead to a positive coefficient. 
The results of this specificationwith birth-certificate data are shown in panel A of 
Table 6. We find that the incidence of c-sections was not significantly higher during the 
reform period (December 2010-January 2011), compared with the surrounding years 
(and relative to October-November). The benefit cancellation thus does not seem to 
have increased the number of babies born via c-section.
28
 
We also estimate equation (3) with the hospital data, using the sample of all 
maternal hospitalizations surrounding birth (panel B of Table 6). The dependent 
variable is an indicator for deliveries that took place via c-section or suffered from any 
other complications. The results confirm that there was no significant increase in the 
incidence of c-sections(or other birth-related complications) in the period surrounding 
the benefit cancellation. These results are consistent with the benefit cancellation mostly 
affecting the timing of births that would have been c-sections in any case, rather than an 
increase in the incidence of this procedure versus natural birth.     
All in all, our results in this section suggest that the effect of the benefit 
cancellation on the timing of births took place at least in part via early scheduling ofc-
sections in private hospitals. However, we do not find evidence for an increase in the 
incidence of c-sections or other birth complications. 
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 We cannot test directly for “switching” versus “extra” inductions with our data. 
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5. Effects on newborn and infant health 
5.1 Empirical strategy 
Once it has been established that the benefit cancellation led to the early scheduling of a 
substantial number of births, we now move on to estimating the potential health impact 
on the affected babies. We expect that, since a number of babies were born earlier, they 
must have been bornsmaller as a result (lower weight at birth), almost mechanically. 
Moreover, if less time in the womb is detrimental, we may expect later health problems 
for the same cohort of babies.The medical literature has documented that lower 
gestational age at birth as well as low birth-weight are associated with a number of 
medical problems after birth, including a higher incidence of respiratory disease(Madar 
et al. 1999, Escobar et al. 2006, Clark et al. 2009, Mally et al. 2010, Boyle et al. 2012).  
In order to pin down the causal effect of shifting births forward on infant health 
outcomes,our identification strategy still relies on comparingbirthstaking place near the 
benefit cancellation date with the surrounding years. However, comparing the health of 
babies born in December 2010 versus January 2011 would conflate the causal effect of 
shifting the birth date with composition effects,due to any potential differential 
characteristics of the families that switched birth from January to December.  
For example, suppose that only the healthier babies were switched and that they 
suffered no health effect. Then, December 2010 newborns would be on average 
healthier than January 2011 ones, giving the impression that the reform improved 
babies’ health. If instead we compare babies born in December 2010 or January 2011 to 
those born in the same months in surrounding years, we would rightly conclude that the 
reform had no effect.In order to overcome this “selection” effect, we compare the health 
of all babies born around the New Year (including both December and January births), 
in the reform period versus the surrounding years. 
It could still be that other factors were affecting the health of newborns in the 
reform period compared with the surrounding years, such as the business cycle or 
weather shocks.In order to account for aggregate time effects, we include October and 
November as “control” months.
29
 We also want to control for family characteristics that 
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 The specification used by Schulkind & Shapiro (2014) is similar in spirit to ours and thus 
addresses composition concerns. 
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may be correlated with newborn health, so we run the regressions at the individual level 
and include demographic controls.  
The sample thus includes births taking place in October, November, December and 
January of 2000-01 to 2011-12, and the specification is the same as equation (3): 
 
(4) Healthit =  + Dec-Jan)itDec2010-Jan2011)it + Xit + t + t, 
 
whereHealth is one of a set of variables measuring the health status of newborn baby i, 
born in year t.We control for demographic characteristics X, and include year dummies 
(in fact indicators for each October-November-December-January set), as well as a 
dummy for December-January births. The main explanatory variable, Dec2010-
Jan2011, takes value 1 for babies born during the reform period, December-January of 
2010-11. 
The coefficient of interest, 2, is thus a difference-in-differences estimate 
thatcompares outcomes for December-January babies born in the reform period (2010-
11) with those born in December-January of the surrounding years, using October-
November births as controls.The main identification assumption is that there was no 
other factor affecting the health of babies born in December 2010-January 2011 
differentially with respect to babies born in October-November 2010,other than 
seasonal factors present every year. 
Our first indicator of health at birth is weight at birth. We use the continuous 
variable in grams as well as its natural log, and we also construct several binary 
indicators (birth-weight under 1,500, 2,500,3,000 and 3,500 grams). As additional 
measures of health at birth, we analyze late fetal deaths and neonatal mortality. 
We then estimate regressions for health outcomes during the first 33 months after 
birth. Since we do not have individual identifiers in the hospital data, we estimate 
equation (4) at the date (j) rather than the individual level: 
 
(5)Healthjt =  + Dec-Jan)jtDec2010-Jan2011)jt + t + jt. 
 
The outcome variable is nowone of a set of hospitalization rates for children born on 
date j of year t, by age and main diagnosis.The same child may have been hospitalized 
multiple times, so the results should be interpreted as number of hospital stays per 100 
births on date j, and not the fraction of babies with at least one hospital stay. We run 
separate regressions for different age ranges and diagnoses. 
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We estimate our health regressions on four different samples. First, we limit the 
sample to only the seven days before and after December 31 (October 31 for the control 
months). We then extend the window to two, three, and four weeks before and 
after.Thefull sample thus includes all births in the last 4 weeks of October and 





5.2 Health outcomes at birth 
The main results for health at birth are reported in Table 7. We first report the results for 
birth-weight. Figure 2 shows average birth-weight for all babies born close to the New 
Year, for the twelve years in our sample, with a linear trend estimated without the 
reform period (we also show birth-weight for October-November births). It is apparent 
that average birth-weight was unusually low in December-January 2010-11, the benefit 
cancellation period. 
This observation is confirmed in our regression analysis. The regression results from 
estimating equation (4) for birth-weight are shown in panel A of Table 7 for the four 
different samples, from 1 to 4 weeks away from the threshold. The dependent variable 
in the first row is just the continuous birth-weight variable. When looking at the 7-day 
window, we find that newborns were on average 15grams smaller in the reform period. 
Although this effect may seem small, it is worth remembering that only 6% of babies in 
this sample were “affected” by the benefit cancellation (see Table 2). Thus, a15-gram 
average effect for all newborns implies that affected babies were on average around 260 
grams smaller (about an 8% effect).
31
 The estimated magnitude of the effect is very 
similar if we take the two-week window sample (300 grams, or about 9%). 
These estimates assume that the benefit cancellation induced no early scheduling 
other than from January to December. If some births were scheduled earlier within 
December or January as a result of the policy change, then our estimates for the 
“affected” babies would be an upper bound. If we assume that at most as many births 
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 We also re-do all of the analysis using only the five most recent October-January sets, from 
2007-2008 to 2011-2012. 
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 According to the results in Table 2, 1,014 births were moved forward in the 1-week sample, 
out of 17,791 births (5.7%). Thus, for those babies who were shifted, the effect was -14.8/0.057 
= -260 grams. For the 2-week window, given that 1,484 births were moved (Table 2) out of 
36,414 (4.1%), the estimated effect for shifted babies is -12.5/0.0408 = -306 grams. 
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were scheduled “within” December or January as “between”, a lower bound for the 
effect on the treated (newborns switched as a result of the policy change) would be half 
the magnitude, i.e. between 130 and 150 grams. 
We also find significant results when we use the natural log of birth-weight as the 
dependent variable (second row of panel A in Table 7). Birth-weight in logs is the 
variable that other papers typically use when studying the medium- and long-term 
effects of birth-weight (Black et al. 2007, Figlio et al. 2014).Babies born close to the 
benefit cancellation date weighted on average 0.5 log-points less, implying that affected 
babies were on average between 4 and 9% smaller.
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We also use as dependent variables indicators for babies born below 1,500,2,500, 
3,000 and 3,500 grams. The results for these thresholds are reported in the last four rows 
of panel A in Table 7. We do not find an increase in the fraction of babies under 1,500 
or 2,500 grams (the two thresholds typically used as indicators of very low and low 
birth-weight, respectively). We do find that the reform led to a significant increase in 
the proportion of babies born below 3,000 and 3,500 grams (for a mean birth-weight of 
3,200), and thus a corresponding decrease in the fraction above those thresholds.The 
results are very similar if we run the analysis using only the five most recent years of 
data (see Table A7).  
Our results are in the same order of magnitude as the existing estimates in the 
literature. Schulkind and Shapiro (2014) estimate reductions between 2.4 and 6.4 grams 
in average birth weight as a result of a $1,000 increase in tax benefits. Given their 
estimate that only 0.7% of births are shifted, those numbers imply decreases in average 
birth weight between 344 (2.4/0.007) and 910 (6.4/0.007) grams for the affected 
children. Gans and Leigh (2009) find an increase in 75 grams in the average birth 
weight when births are delayed in order to qualify for a new baby bonus. Given that 
about 16% of births were successfully delayed, their estimates imply that affected 
babies were approximately 460 (75/0.16) grams heavier. 
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 According to the results in Table 2, 1,014 births were shifted forward in the 1-week window, 
out of 17,791 births (5.7%). If we assume that at most as many births were shifted “within” 
December or January as “between”, then the proportion of affected babies would be double this 
figure (11.4%). Given that the benefit cancellation lowered average birth weight by 0.5 log-
points (column 1 in Panel A of Table 7), then the effect on birth weight for babies whose birth 
was shifted was between -0.005/0.057 = -8.6 and -0.005/0.114=-4.3 log-points. 
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Towards the end of the pregnancy (weeks 37 to 39), a fetus is thought to gain about 
200 grams a week (Doublet et al. 1997). In our data, one extra week of gestation is 
associated with about 150 grams higher weight at birth.
33
 Thus, our birth-weight results 
are consistent with effects on gestational length of about one week for affected newborn 
babies.  
Panel B of Table 7 estimates the effect of the benefit cancellation on late fetal deaths 
and 24-hour mortality, as extreme measures of health at birth. The coefficients are 
positive, but not significantly different from zero. 
Ourregression results suggest that the shifting of birth dates as a result of the benefit 
cancellation led toa significant reduction in birth-weight for the affected babies, 
although not at the very bottom of the weight distribution.It would be tempting to claim 
that, since the fraction of very small babies did not increase, the early scheduling may 
havehad no real health effects. This is not supported by the previous literature, which 
finds significant long-term effects of birth-weight on a range of outcomes, not only for 
babies at the bottom of the distribution (Royer 2009, Figlio et al. 2014). In any case, we 
provide additional evidence on health effects using data on post-birth hospitalizations,as 
a more unequivocal measure of health problems. 
 
5.3 Health effects beyond birth 
We have documented that the benefit cancellation led to a significant shifting of births 
towards December 2010, which in turn led to a cohort of babies born earlier and with 
significantly lower weight. We next analyze the effect on hospitalization rates from 




Panel A in Table 8 shows the results of estimating equation (5) for hospitalization 
rates at different age ranges. The first row shows that there was no significant spike in 
hospitalizations during the first week after birth in the period surrounding the benefit 
cancellation date.
35
 This suggests that the shifting of birthdates around the New Year of 
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 This coefficient comes from a regression for birth-weight in our sample, where we control for 
sex and multiplicity, as well as a linear term in weeks of gestation. 
34
 See Tables A8 and A9 for the results when using the shorter sample (2007-08 to 2011-12 
births). 
35
 We reported a similar finding in Borra, González & Sevilla (2016), where we show 
hospitalization results for ages 0 to 21 days, without disaggregating by diagnosis. 
28 
 
2011 did not lead to an increase in birth complications (as shown also with maternal 
hospitalizations in panel B of Table 6). We do find a significantly elevated 
hospitalization rate for our turn-of-the-year babies when they were between 7 days and 
one month of age. The magnitude of the estimated effects suggests that the cohort of 
affected children suffered a hospitalization rate between 0.0060 and 0.0077 higher than 
normal during the first month of life. Since the average hospitalization rate in this age 
range was 0.0343 (Table A1), this represents about a 20% increase. The magnitude is 
highest in the two and three-week window samples. 
For ages after one month, the coefficients are not statistically significant at 95% for 
any of the age ranges or samples. The effect on hospitalizations during the first year of 
life is positive, if statistically insignificant. The effects at later ages (12 to 33 months) 
are negative, albeit again insignificant. The overall effect (age 0 to 33 months) is not 
significantly different from zero. This pattern suggests that the increase in early 
hospitalizations for the affected cohort may have been followed by an (imprecisely 
estimated) decrease in the following months, with a zero (or small) overall effect on 
hospitalization rates by ages 12 and 33 months.   
Panel B of Table 8 shows the results for mortality rates by ages 2 and 12 months. 
We find that the affected cohort of children did not suffer a significant increase in infant 
mortality rates (we also tried other age ranges, with similarly insignificant results). 
Overall, the effects reported in Table 8 translate into more than 400 additional 
hospitalizations at ages one to four weeks
36
 (for between 2,000 and 4,000 “treated” 
children). Given that each overnight hospitalization of an infant (aged less than one 
year) has an estimated average cost of about 4,900€ (according to the Spanish Registry 
of Hospital Discharges, Ministry of Health 2014), our estimates imply that the increase 
in hospitalizations driven by the benefit cancellation had a direct cost of up to two 
million Euros.This estimated cost is however an upper bound, which may be attenuated 
if there were indeed fewer hospitalizations after the first two months, as the negative 
coefficients for later ages suggest. 
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In the 3-week window sample, the estimated effect is 0.0077. Multiplying by the total number 




We then run parallel specifications where the dependent variable is the 
hospitalization rate for specific diagnoses.We focus on the most frequent categories (as 
reported in Table A1), in order to capture the main driver(s) of the effects documented 
in Table 8, and aggregate the three earlier age groups. The results are reported in Table 
9. 
The most common group of diagnosesat very early ages is “perinatal conditions” 
(about 34% of all hospital stays in our full sample).We find no significant increase in 
“perinatal” hospitalizations in the first two months of life (Panel A of Table 9). The 
main 3-digit “perinatal” diagnosis is “perinatal infection”, and the results also show 
small, insignificant coefficients. 
The second most common diagnosis associated with hospital stays is respiratory 
disease (with 24% of all hospital stays in the full sample), and the most frequent 3-digit 
code in this category is bronchitis (“acute bronchitis or bronchiolitis”). We findthat the 
cohort of children born close to the benefit cancellation date suffered abnormally high 
hospitalization rates for respiratory disease during the first two months of life (Panel A 
of Table 9). This effect is driven by bronchitis. 
The coefficients for respiratory disease and bronchitis at ages zero to two months in 
Table 9 decline in magnitude as we broaden the window of birth-dates around the 
threshold. This is consistent with our previous results for birth-weight, and reflects the 
fact that the fraction of affected infants in the sample declines as we move away from 
the cutoff date.Note that broadening the range of birth-dates around the threshold has 
two competing effects. One the one hand, the broader the window, the lower the 
fraction of affected children (whose birth-date was shifted). On the other hand, as we 
move away from the threshold, the additional affected children have potentially been 
shifted by more. The overall impact on the magnitude of the “intent-to-treat” health 
effects is unclear. Overall, it seems that the former effect dominates, since the 
magnitude of the coefficient declines as the window widens for our main health 
outcomes. This is the case for the birth-weight results (Table 7), as well as for our main 
health results, i.e. the increase in respiratory disease (mainly bronchitis) between birth 
and 2 months of age (Table 9). The main exception is the estimates for the 
hospitalization rate at ages 7 to 30 days (Table 8). 
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Comparing the estimated coefficients with the average incidence of respiratory 
disease and bronchitis in these age ranges reveals that the cohort of affected children 
suffered a 25% increase in hospitalization rates for respiratory disease (28% in 
bronchitis), at ages zero to two months (using the coefficient from the 2-week window 
sample).
37
The estimated effects are of similar magnitude when we use only the more 
recent years as controls (see Table A9), and they translate into almost 450 “extra” 
hospital stays for respiratory disease in this age range.
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We find no significant effect on any of the main diagnoses for the older age groups. 
When we aggregate all hospitalizations by age 33 months (panel D of Table 9), the 
coefficients for bronchitis are positive, and significant in the larger samples (due to 
better precision). 
Overall, the results from Tables 7-9 suggest that the newborns whose birth-date was 
affected by the benefit cancellation weighed between 130 and 300 grams less at birth 
compared with control babies, and suffered a much higher risk of overnight 
hospitalization during the first two months of life, primarily due to respiratory 
disease.We know from the medical literature that only a small fraction of bronchitis 
cases (about 1%) require overnight hospitalization (Fitzgerald 2011). This suggests that 
the total effect of early birth on the incidence of respiratory disease is likely to be much 
broader than we can capture with hospital records. We do not find essentially any 
significant effects on hospitalization rates after two months of age. 
 
5.4 Mechanisms and robustness checks 
We have shown (Tables 8-9) that children born in December 2010-January 2011 
suffered more overnight hospitalizations during their first two months of life, compared 
with infants born in the same dates of the surrounding years, and relative to October-
November births. We interpret these results as the effect of the cancellation of the baby 
bonus in January 2011, which led many families to shift birth from January to 
December. In this section, we discuss two potential issues with our interpretation. First, 
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The relevant coefficient for age 0-2 months is 0.0088 (Table 9). The average incidence of 
respiratory disease in this age range is 0.0355 (Table A1). Thus, the estimated increase as a 
fraction of average incidence is 0.0088/0.0355=0.25. 
38
The relevant coefficient in the 3-week window sample is 0.0079 (Table 9). Multiplying by the 
total number of births during the relevant 6 weeks, the estimated increase in respiratory 
hospitalizations is 434 (0.0079x54,965). 
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were there any confounding factors that could have driven the reported increase in 
hospitalizations? And second, what specific aspects of the policy change are driving the 
results?We also try to reconcile our results with previous findings in the medical 
literature. 
Robustness checks 
Regarding potential confounding factors, we are not aware of other contemporaneous 
policy changes that would have affected December 2010-January 2011 babies 
differentially with respect to October-November births during their first three years of 
life.However, we may worry that the effects on respiratory disease could be driven by 
weather or air quality spikes, since poor air quality has been shown to affect children’s 
health negatively (Neidell 2004, Currie et al. 2009, Coneus and Spiess 2012). We 
perform two checks in order to rule out this possibility.  
First, we check that the winter of 2010-11 was not one of particularly high 
incidence of bronchitis among the population aged 2 and older. To this end, we create a 
daily database with all bronchitis hospitalizations in November, December, January and 
February of 2000-01 to 2011-12. Our “affected” cohort of children was born in late 
December-early January of 2010-11, so that the spike in hospitalizations when they 
were one week to two months old would show up mostly in January-February 2011 
hospital stays. Thus, we run regressions where the outcome variable is the daily number 
of bronchitis hospitalizations (of individuals in a given age range), and the main 
explanatory variable is an indicator for January-February 2011. We control for calendar 
month fixed-effects and turn-of-the-year dummies. The results are reported in Table 10. 
We again detect an abnormally high number of bronchitis hospitalizations in early 2011 
among one-week to two-month olds (about 12.5, or 34 log-points,“too many” hospital 
stays per day). However, there is no spike in bronchitis among older children, or among 
adults. We also fail to find any contemporaneous spike in asthma-related 
hospitalizations, for any age range.
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Second, we re-estimated the regressions in Table 9 excluding Madrid from the 
sample (panel A of Table A10), given that air quality in Madrid is notoriously bad in the 
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 We find a reduction in asthma hospitalizations in logs for 1-week to 2-month-old babies. 
However, the magnitude of this “effect” is very small, as seen in the specification in levels (the 
incidence of asthma among newborns is very low). 
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winter months, and it is likely that February experiences severe thermal inversions that 
result in large increases in air pollution exposure. This could drive our results if there 
wereimportant age-based nonlinearities, combined with a pollution spike in February 
2011. The results are robust to the exclusion of the province of Madrid from the sample.  
A related concern is the influenza season. Recent evidence suggests that gestational 
length may be affected by maternal flu (Currie and Schwandt, 2013), and the flu season 
peaks in January-February. In order to rule out that an unusual flu season is driving our 
results, we re-estimate our baseline regressions, including as a control the overall 
incidence of the flu in the month of birth, as made public by the Spanish National 
Statistical Institute (see panel B of Table A10).The coefficients of interest are barely 
altered.  
Mechanisms 
There are several channels through which the benefit cancellation could have affected 
the health of the relevant cohort. As we have shown, many children were born early, 
and shorter gestational age could have had persistent health effects. However, there are 
at least three other possibilities. The excess of births in December 2010 could have 
generated congestion in hospitals, pushing doctors to perform births faster or do things 
differently, with potentially persistent infant health effects. Moreover, babies born in 
January 2011 did not receive the 2,500 baby bonus, while October-November 2010 
births did, which could be an additional reason why December 2010-January 2011 
babies have more health problems compared with October-November 2010 ones. 
Finally, the announcement of the benefit cancellation could have generated elevated 
stress levels among pregnant women with due dates near the threshold, potentially 
leading to early birth and negative effects on infant health. 
First, the available evidence suggests that congestion effects were probably not 
important. We didn’t find anyincrease in birth complications around the benefit 
cancellation date, for either mothers (panel B of Table 6) or children (first row of panel 
A in table 8). Moreover, Figure A1 (and Table 3) show that the increase in the 
December 2010 number of births was quite spread out over the last two or three weeks 
of the year. The highest number of daily births was reached on December 21, but only 
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with under 10% more births than the busiest day of December 2009. We also find that 
the excess December births were quite spread out geographically.
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Second, the children born in January 2011 did not receive the 2,500 benefit, which 
could lead to worse health outcomes compared with October-November 2010 infants 
(Hoynes et al. 2015). We address this possibility in two ways. We estimate an additional 
specification where we include February and March as additional “control” months, 
given that children born in February and March of 2011 also did not receive the benefit. 
We also run specifications where we directly control for benefit eligibility(a dummy 
equal to 1 for births taking place between July 2007 and December 2010).
41
 The results 
of these additional specifications are reported in panels C and D of Table A10.
42
The 
hospitalization results remain, suggesting that benefit receipt is not the main driver of 
the worse health outcomes of December 2010-January 2011 births.
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Finally, regarding maternal stress, recent studies looking at the effect of stress levels 
during pregnancy on birth (and later) outcomes seem to suggest that the effect is small. 
Aizer et al. (2016) use a siblings fixed-effects approach, and find no significant effect of 
maternal stress (measured as cortisol levels during pregnancy) on birth weight or 
gestation length. Other recent studies have analyzed the effects of maternal stress driven 
by extreme events, such as wars, terrorist attacks, or natural disasters. Their findings 
suggest small negative effects on birth weight and gestation, especially during the first 
trimester of the pregnancy (Camacho 2008, Eskenazi et al. 2007, Torche 2011, Mansour 
and Rees 2012, Foureaux and Manacorda 2016). The average decline in birth weight 
associated with high levels of stress is relatively low, ranging from the 30-grams decline 
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 We find that the timing effect was present across most Spanish provinces. Table A11 shows 
that, even in the provinces where the effect was most pronounced, it translated into less than 1 
extra daily birth per hospital in the last week of December 2010. 
41
 Benefit eligibility is not found to be significantly associated with health at birth or 
hospitalization rates (results not shown). Hoynes et al. (2015) found a positive effect of cash 
benefits during pregnancy on newborn health, but the Spanish benefit was paid weeks or months 
after birth (compared to during pregnancy), so that any effects on health at birth or shortly after 
would have had to take place via families adjusting their behavior during pregnancy in 
anticipation of future benefit receipt. 
42
 See also Table A12 for birth-weight regressions that control for benefit eligibility. 
43
 We also estimate “placebo”regressions where February and March are labeled as “treated” 
months, and find no effect of the benefit cancellation on hospitalizations, thus confirming that 
benefit receipt had no effect in this dimension. Results are available upon request. 
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in areas with at least one landmine explosion in each trimester of pregnancy (Camacho 
2008) to the 50-grams decline associated with exposure to an earthquake during the first 
trimester (Torche 2011).  Any increase in stress levels generated by the cancellation of 
the benefit in Spain would most likely not qualify as in the same order of magnitude as 
a war or natural disaster, and is more likely to fall within the “normal” ranges of stress 
analysed by Aizer et al (2016). Thus, we attribute between zero and a very small 
fraction of our birth timing and health effects to maternal stress during pregnancy. 
We have thus shown that the cancellation of the baby bonus led to a large number of 
births being shifted from January 2011 to December 2010 (via scheduled c-sections and 
inductions).The evidence is consistent with this shifting of birth-dates having had 
important health effects on the relevant cohort of babies, as reflected in a higher 
incidence of hospitalizations during the first two months of life, many related to 
respiratory disorders. We do not think this can be attributed to congestion in hospitals, 
to the January births not receiving the monetary benefit, or to increased maternal stress. 
The most likely channel seems to be shorter gestational age at birth (lower fetal 
maturation) driven by a shifting of (elective) scheduled births, given that we did not find 
a higher incidence of c-sections (see section 4.4). 
Reconciling our results with the medical literature 
The medical literatureprovides evidence of a correlation between gestational age (and/or 
low birth-weight) and respiratory disease (Liu et al. 2014, Goyal et al. 2011), as well as 
specifically acute bronchitis and bronchiolitis, both during infancy (Koehoorn et al 
2008, Boyce et al 2000) and early childhood (Odibo et 2006).Negative associations are 
even reported in medical studies where shorter gestation is the result of elective 
inductions and c-sections (Madar et al. 1999, Clark et al 2009).  
In terms of medical pathways, lung volume is known to undergo rapid changes 
during the last trimester of gestation (Kugelman et al. 2013), and there is evidence that 
early, scheduled birth (“birth in the absence of labor”) may deprive the fetus of certain 
hormonal changes that take place during the last few weeks of pregnancy and during the 
onset of spontaneous labor, which affect pulmonary maturation and may contribute to 
pulmonary dysfunction after birth, even for late preterm or early term babies 
(Goldenberg and Nelson 1975, Jain and Eaton 2006, Mally et al. 2010). 
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The magnitude of our results is roughly consistent with some of the correlations 
reported in the medical literature. For example, Dietz et al. (2011), using hospital data 
for the US, find that the hospitalization rate in the first two weeks after birth (excluding 
delivery hospitalizations) was more than 70% higher for children born at 38 weeks, 
compared with those born at 39-40 weeks. Boyle et al. (2012), using data from the 
British Millennium Cohort Study, find that the proportion of babies needing three or 
more hospital admissions during the first 9 months was 90% higher among babies born 
at 37-38 weeks than among those born at 39-41 weeks.Our results suggest that the 
children affected by the benefit cancellation suffered a hospitalization rate between 50 
and 90% higherthan the control group during the first four weeks after birth.
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Some medical studies have found correlations between gestational age and 
hospitalizations for a range of diagnoses, including gastrointestinal disease, and 
associations with respiratory disease that persist for months or even years (for example, 
Boyle et al. 2012). However, these studies are all correlational, so they should not be 
interpreted causally. If children born smaller/earlier have other underlying health 
problems, those studies would be over-estimating the effects of gestational age on 
health. Our results (short-term effects on respiratory disease only) suggest that some of 
these previous findings can in fact be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity/omitted 
variable bias. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
We take advantage of the cancellation of a child benefit in Spain in December 2010to 
analyze the effect of scheduling birth early on the health of newborns. We exploit 
individual-level birth- and death-certificates and hospital data, focusing on births very 
close to the cutoff date. We find that many families were able to bring forward their 
date of birth in order to qualify for the 2,500-Euro benefit. We also find that the shifting 
of birth-dates took place at least in part via the early scheduling of c-sections in private 
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 Table A1 shows that the average hospitalization rate was 0.1440+0.0343=0.178 during the 
first 30 days after birth. Table 8 shows that the effect of the benefit cancellation was to increase 
the hospitalization rate by -0.0020+0.0067=0.0047(in the +/- 4 week window sample). Given 
there were 72,771 births in the “treated” 8-week period, this translates into 342 extra 
hospitalizations (72,771*0.0047). But only between 2,000 and 4,000 children were actually 
shifted because of the policy change (Table 2), so the percentage increase in the hospitalization 
rate for the treated is between 342/2,053=0.17 and 342/4,106=0.08, which, over the average of 
0.178, equals 0.17/0.178=93% or 0.08/0.178=47%. 
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hospitals. Early delivery had significant health consequences for the affected babies. 
Children who were born early as a result of the reform weighedbetween 130 and 300 
grams less at birth, on average. They were also about 33% more likely to be 
hospitalized for respiratory disease at ages 7 to 59 days. 
Our results provide new, credible empirical evidence showing that scheduling 
birthearly for non-medical reasons can have important (short-term)health consequences 
for babies. We interpret our results as showing that scheduling birth about one week 
early (for mostly full-term pregnancies) leads to less mature,smaller newborns that are 
hospitalized more often in their first months of life.  
Long-term evaluation of these effects is not possible yet, but we can use the 
findings in the existing literature to place our results into perspective. For example, 
regarding longer-term health effects, the medical literature suggests thatchildren 
hospitalized for bronchiolitis during infancy are at higher risk of developing recurrent 
wheezing or asthma during childhood (Henderson et al 2005). As for other relevant 
long-term outcomes, Figlio et al. (2014), using register data from the state of Florida, 
find that a 4 to 9 percent drop in birth-weight, such as the one that we find, would 
translate into 0.02 to 0.045 of a standard deviation decrease in test scores.
45
 Bhalotra 
and Venkataramani (2015) show that an 18% (one standard deviation) decline in 
exposure to respiratory disease during infancy (in the US) results in an increase of 0.1 
years of schooling, a 0.4 percentage-point increase in the employment rate, and a 1.5% 
increase in family income.  
These estimates are unlikely to translate directly to Spain. We present them only as 
suggestive of the order of magnitude of the potential long-term effects of scheduling 
birth early. It is also worth noting that our Spanish December 2010 babies received a 
2,500-Euro benefit, which may have had positive compensating effects on their health 
and development. However, in this study we are not interested in the long-term effects 
of the Spanish benefit cancellation per se. Combined with recent results in the literature, 
our findings suggest that tinkering with the timing of birth for convenience (or 
economic) reasons may have negative long-term effects for babies. 
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 Royer’s (2009) estimates from California birth records imply that a decrease in birth weight 
of 260 grams leads to a drop in educational attainment of about 0.10 years. Black et al.’s (2007) 
results for Norway imply that a 9% decrease in birth weight lowers the probability of high 
school completion by about 0.9 percentage points, and full-time earnings by about 1 percent. 
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Our results have several policy implications. Firstly, despite the existing evidence 
on the long-run consequences of poor infant health, little is known regarding what kinds 
of early interventions would successfully affect health at birth and subsequent 
outcomes. We identify one such intervention (scheduling birth early for non-medical 
reasons), which is widely used in practice as well as easy to target via policy, credibly 
showing how it can affect health outcomes, at birth as well as later on. Policies that 
discourage the elective scheduling of birth for non-medical reasons may thus lead to 
significant positive effects on infant health. 
Secondly, our findings also suggest that announcement effects are important. The 
government announced the benefit cancellation seven months in advance, with a single 
cutoff date. It would perhaps have been advisable to devise a not-so-steep cancellation 
mechanism, so that, for instance, the benefit amount could have declined more slowly 
over time. 
Finally, our results also highlight the fact that parents may be willing to trade-off 
income and health, at least to some extent.In this context, accurate information about the 
health consequences of scheduling birth early for non-medical reasons can help inform 
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Appendix I. Magnitude of the effect of economic incentives on the 
timing of births 
We compute the percentage point change in the birth probability associated with a 
US$1,000 change in 2010 dollar terms. To that end, we translate the benefit amount to 
dollars in the corresponding benefit year using data on Purchasing Power Parities 
(OECD 2016), and inflate that amount to 2010 US$ using the Consumer Price Index 
(BLS, 2016). 
 
Dickert-Conlin, S. and Chandra, A. (1999) 
They estimate that increasing the child tax-benefit by $500 raises the probability of 
having a child in the last week of December by 26.9 percent (page 161). Therefore, for 
US$1000 of 2010 ($689.5 in the year of their analysis 1996), the corresponding increase 
amounts to 37.09 percent. Given that there are around 52% of children born in the last 
week of December (page 170), a 37.09% increase in the probability of having a child in 
December suggests an increase of approximately 19.2 percentage points (37.09*0.52) in 
the probability of giving birth in December as opposed to January. 
 
LaLumia, S., Sallee, J.M and Turner, N. (2015) 
They estimate that an additional $1,000 of tax savings is associated with a 1 percentage 
point increase in the probability that a birth occurs in the last week of December (page 
258). Their estimates are inflation-adjusted to the year 2009 and remain roughly the 
same when adjusted to 2010 US$. 
 
Schulkind, Lisa and Shapiro T.M. (2014) 
They estimate that a $1000 increase in tax benefits results in between a 0.37 and a 0.54 
percentage point increase in the probability of a December birth, depending on the 
specification (page 144). Their estimates are given for 2000 US$ values, which 
correspond to US$1266.3 in 2010. Therefore, for a 2010 US$1000 increase their 
findings imply between 0.29 and 0.43 percentage points increase in the probability of a 
December birth as opposed to a January birth. 
 
Gans and Leigh (2009)  
They estimate that 16% of births were shifted as a response to the implementation of the 
AUS$ 3,000 benefit in 2004 (Table 1, page 251).  Given that AUS$ 3,000 in 2004 
correspond to US$2604 in 2010, an increase in 2010 US$1000 would imply 6.2% of 
births being shifted. Assuming that in the absence of the policy 50 per cent of births 
happen in July (as opposed to June), a 6.2 percent shift in births corresponds to 3.1 
percentage points (0.50*6.2).  This policy replaced an existing income-dependent 
benefit. The authors acknowledge that for some households, the difference between the 
old payment and the new payment may have been less than $3000 and therefore their 
estimate overstates the impact of a AUS$3000 financial incentive on birth timing.  
 
Tamm, M. (2012) 
The author reports that an average increase of €1730 in 2007 (€6730 with the new 
policy minus €5000 with the old scheme) leads to an 8 percent increase in the 
probability of a January birth (Table 2, pages 8 and 9).Given that €1730 in 2007 
correspond to 2010 US$2192, the equivalent increase in the probability of a January 
birth for a 2010 US$1000 increase is 3.65 percent. Assuming that in the absence of 
policy 50 per cent of births happen in January (as opposed to December), the 
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corresponding point increase in the probability of a January birth is 1.82 percentage 
points (0.50*3.65). 
 
Neugart, M. and Ohlsson, H. (2013) 
They report that the average increase of €4956 in 2006/7 leads to a 5 percentage point 
increase in January births. The sample includes working mothers only (Table 4, pages 
101 and 102). Given that 2006 €4956 are equivalent to 2010 US$6537, a 2010 $1000 
increase would lead to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability of a January 
birth as opposed to a February birth. 
 
Brunner, Beatrice and Kuhn, Andreas (2014) 
They report about 8% extra births in December 1996 (the month before the benefit 
cancellation, see page 373). The mean benefit introduced by this policy was about 1996 
€1000, which is equivalent to 2010 US$1478. Therefore, for a 2010 US$1000 their 
findings imply a 5.41 percent increase. Assuming that in the absence of policy 50 per 
cent of births happen in December (as opposed to January), the corresponding point 
increase in the probability of a December birth is 2.7 percentage points (0.50*5.41). 
 
This paper 
In Table 2 we report an increase in the number of December births between 6 and 12%, 
depending on the length of the window (+/- 1 week or +/- 4 weeks) for the €2500 
benefit in 2010. This benefit is equivalent to 2010 US$3333. Therefore, for a 2010 
US$1000 our findings imply an increase in births ranging from 3.6 to 1.8 percent. 
Giving that 50 per cent of births happen in December (as opposed to January) in our 
sample, the corresponding point increase in the probability of a December birth is 





Appendix II.A simple theoretical framework 
We frame our empirical analysis in terms of a simple model of a utility-maximizing 
household in the tradition of Becker (1965) and Grossman (1972).The model focuses on 
the tradeoffs faced by a household when deciding whether to schedule birth early (for 
non-medical reasons), and the resulting impact on the health of the child. We assume 
that households derive utility from a composite consumption good (c) and infant health 
(h): 
(1) U(c,h) = u(c) + v(h),  
whereu and v are both strictly increasing and concave functions of c and h, respectively. 
The household is expecting a child with due date in January 2011, and maximizes utility 
with respect to the binary decision of whether to schedule birth in December or not, 
denoted by s, where s takes value 1 if the birth is scheduled in December, and 0 
otherwise.
46
 If s=0, with a high probability pthe birth takes place in January (either 
spontaneously, or as a result of it having been scheduled for medical reasons).
47
 
The household is subject to a budget constraint, and an infant health production 
function. The budget constraint is (in expected value)c=y+(b-)s+b(1-p)(1-s), where 
the price of the composite consumption good c is normalized to 1, and y is household 
labor income. We assume that the household supplies 1 unit of labor inelastically, and 
that leisure does not enter the utility function. The household receives the child benefit 
bif the birth is scheduled in December (s=1) or if it happens early for natural reasons 
(with probability 1-p). Scheduling birth has a cost  (e.g. the cost of convincing the 
doctor to schedule for non-medical reasons). 
The infant health production function ish = h(s).We denote by h1 the health 
outcome of the child under s=1 (i.e. if the delivery date is shifted to December), and h0 
as the health outcome under s=0 (no shift). We hypothesize (but do not impose) that 
h0>h1 (i.e. h1-h0<0).
48
 Households may have imperfect information about the infant 
health production function (the values of h0 and h1).
49
 
The householdwill choose to schedule birth early (s=1) if and only if:U(y+b-, h1) 
> U(y+b(1-p), h0), i.e.u(y+b-) + v(h1) > u(y+b(1-p)) + v(h0), oru(y+b-) - u(y+b(1-
p)) > - [v(h1) - v(h0)]. The first term in the last inequality is positive (if b->b(1-p), or 
b>/p) sinceu is strictly increasing in income. The second term is 0 if there are no 
health effects of scheduling birth (h1=h0), and positive if there are negative health 
effects (sincev is strictly increasing in h). If parents have imperfect information about 
                                                          
46
 We assume that doctors and other health professionals play no explicit role in the decision of 
scheduling birth early. 
47
 The assumption that the scheduling decision sis binary obscures the fact that, in practice, there 
are three steps involved: scheduling the birth or not, and, if so, induction versus c-section, and 
when. The procedure may have direct effects on infant health, while the timing decision will 
affect the maturation of the fetus at birth, which can also affect health. We try to disentangle 
these two effects (procedure vs. timing) in the empirical analysis.  
48
 We assume that receiving the benefit has no direct effect on infant health (via income). 
49
 In fact, h1–h0 is exactly what we are trying to learn about in our empirical analysis.  
46 
 
h(s), they will use their “best guess” when making their decision, perhaps assisted by a 
medical professional. 
 Note that, in the absence of the child benefit (b=0), a family would only schedule 
birth in December for medical reasons (if they believe that h1-h0>0). If (parents believe 
that) h1-h0<0, thenthe benefit cancellation creates a simple trade-off:the household will 
schedule birth early if and only if the increase in u from receivingb with probability 
1(net of ) is greater than the potential decrease in vfrom scheduling early. If scheduling 
is thought to be harmless (h1=h0), the household will schedule early if the benefit is 
large enough(b>p 
From this perspective, our empirical analysis can be seen as providing us with an 
estimate for the average value ofh1–h0, for the subset of families that chose to schedule 
birth early as a result of the benefit cancellation. 
Note that in this basic version of the model, if scheduling birth early has no health 
benefits for the infant (h1-h0≤0), then receiving the benefit is the only reason for a 
family to choose s=1. We could easily extend the household utility functionin order to 
incorporate the possibility that families may derive direct utility from scheduling birth 
early, either for “convenience” reasons, or even for reasons related to the health of the 
mother.
50
 In this extended setup, scheduling birth early increases utility via 
consumption, but also via this additional “convenience” channel. However, the relevant 
trade-off generated by the benefit cancellation, as well as the interpretation of our 
empirical results, remains unchanged. The empirical analysis would be providing us 
with an estimate for the average value ofh1–h0, for the subset of families “affected” by 
the benefit cancellation. 
This simple model generates implications for the kinds of households that are 
expected to react to the benefit cancellation. A household will be more likely to 
schedule birth early (s=1) as a result of the policy change if: i) it places a high value on 
consumption (so that b leads to a large increase in utility via u); and/or ii) it does not 
place a high value on infant health (via v); and/or iii) its labor income level y is low, so 
that the marginal utility of income is high; and/or iv) its (expected) health cost of 
scheduling birth early (h1–h0) is small (or negative); and/or v) the cost of scheduling 
birth early () is low, and/or vi) the probability that the birth takes place in December 




                                                          
50
 For example, the utility function could be modeled as:U(c,h,s)=u(c)+v(h(s))+s, where 
would capture the direct utility gains from scheduling birth early. This setup leads to three 
possible cases: the household may not want to schedule birth (even in the presence of the 
benefit, b>0), it may want to schedule even in the absence of the benefit (b=0, for 
“convenience” reasons), or it may not schedule for convenience reasons only, but be “pushed” 
to schedule by the cancellation of the benefit. This third case would define households 
“affected” by the benefit cancellation. Theconditionfors=1isnow: U(y+b-, h1, 1) > U(y, h0, 0), 
i.e. u(y+b-) + v(h1) + > u(y) + v(h1), or + [u(y+b-) - u(y)] > - [v(h1) – v(h0)]. 
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Figure 1. Fraction of births in December (October), out of all births in Spain close 
to December 31 (October 31), in years 2000-01 to 2011-12 
 
A. One-week window 
 
B. Two-week window 
 
C. Three-week window 
 
 
Source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. The diamonds 
(crosses) show the fraction of December (October) births, out of all births close to December (October) 



































includes births from Dec. (Oct.) 18 to Jan. (Nov.) 14, and panel C, from Dec. (Oct.) 11 to Jan. (Nov.) 21. 
The dotted lines are horizontal, highlighting the range of variation in the non-reform years. 
 
Figure 2. Average birth-weight in grams of all babies born in Spain close to 
December 31(October 31) in years 2000-01 to 2011-12 
 








Source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. The diamonds 
(crosses) show average birth-weight for births close to December 31 (October 31).Panel A includes all 
births between December (October) 25 and January (November) 7; panel B includes births from Dec. 
(Oct.) 18 to Jan. (Nov.) 14.The solid line is a linear trend estimated using December and January for all 
years except 2010-11. The dotted lines are parallel to the linear trend, highlighting the range of variation 




































































Table 1. Previous studies on financial incentives, birth timing and infant health  
 








Lower tax liability for 
December births.                              
Country: US.                                  
Amount: Average tax savings 
from a December birth about 
US$790 US.                     
Incentive: Bring forward. 
Dickert-Conlin, S. 
and Chandra, A. 
(1999).  
Daily birth data from the 
US NLSY (1979-1992) 
19 p. points in the 
probability of a last week 
of Dec. vs. a 1st week of 
Jan. birth. 
No None None 
LaLumia, S., Sallee, 
J.M & Turner, N. 
(2015) 
Social Security 
administration data plus 
tax filers data 
1 p. point increase in the 
probability of a last week 
of Dec. vs. 1st week of 
Jan. birth. 
No None None 
Schulkind, Lisa and 
Shapiro T.M. (2014)  
Monthly birth records 
from the US Vital 
Statistics (1990 to 2000) 
0.3 to 0.4 p. point increase 
in the probability of a Dec. 
vs. a Jan. birth. 
No Birth-weight, weeks of 
gestation, assisted 
ventilation, Apgar 
scores, delivery method 
None 
Policies aimed at reducing 
early elective deliveries in the 
US 
Incentive: Postpone 
Buckles, K. and M. 
Guldi (2016) 
US Vital Statistics N.A. (no monetary 
incentive) 
N.A. Birth-weight, precipitous 
labor, birth injury, 
assisted ventilation 
None 
Introduction of a baby bonus. 
Date: July 1, 2004.                      
Country: Australia.         
Amount: $3000. 
Replacedanincome-
dependentbenefit.                       
Incentive: Postpone. 
Gans, Joshua S. & 
Leigh, Andrew 
(2009)  
Daily birth data from 
Australian birth records 
(1975-2004)  
3.1 p. point increase in the 
probability of a first week 
of July vs. last week of 
June birth. 
Yes (announcement 
a few weeks in 
advance) 
Birth-weight, delivery 
method, infant mortality 
None 
Reform of parental leave 
system and benefits.  
Date: January 1, 2007.                                    
Country: Germany.            
Amount: Btw €3,600 less and 
€25,200 more (earnings-
dependent), paid for up to 14 
months.                           
Incentive: Postpone. 
Tamm, M. (2012) Daily birth data from 
German Birth records 
(2000-2007) 
1.8 p. point increase in the 
probability of a 1st week 
of Jan. vs. last week of 
Dec. birth.  
Yes (announcement 
in September 2006) 
Birth weight, length at 
birth 
None 
Neugart, M. and 
Ohlsson, H. (2013) 
Daily birth data from 
German Birth records 
(2004-2007). 
Workingmothersonly. 
0.8 p. point increase in the 
probability of a 1st week 
of Jan. vs. last week of 
Dec. birth. 
Yes (announcement 
in September 2006) 
None None 
Abolition of a child benefit. 
Date: January 1, 1997.              
Country: Austria.               
Amount: Max  €1,090.                 
Incentive:Bring forward. 
Brunner, Beatrice & 
Kuhn, Andreas 
(2014) 
Monthly birth data from 
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US$1,000 change in 2010 dollar terms. To that end, we translate each benefit amount to dollars in the corresponding benefit year using data on Purchasing 





Table 2. The effect of the benefit cancellation on the timing of births 
 
 
+/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
 Panel A. Birth-certificate data         
     Dep. var.: Number of births 289.90*** 212.23*** 179.60*** 146.67*** 
 
(43.522) (31.079) (23.221) (21.267) 
Number of births moved 1014 1484 1886 2053 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of births) 0.224*** 0.162*** 0.138*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.028) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) 
Share of births moved 12% 9% 7% 6% 
          
Panel B. Hospital data 
    
     Dep. var.: Number of maternal  335.81*** 205.61*** 158.71*** 124.40*** 
hospitalizations  (47.399) (37.677) (28.669) (24.071) 
Number of births moved 1175 1439 1666 1742 
     Dep. var.: ln (number of maternal  0.383*** 0.230*** 0.177*** 0.137*** 
hosp.) (0.065) (0.046) (0.034) (0.028) 
Share of births moved 21% 12% 9% 7% 
          
N 168 336 504 672 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of week dummies Y Y Y Y 
Holiday dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week Y Y Y Y 
Day of year dummies Y Y Y Y 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012, and 
Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010dummy (the month right before benefit 
cancellation)from equation (1). An observation is a day. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 
the daily (log) number of births, and the sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of 
December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-
January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-12. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the daily (log) 
number of birth-related maternal hospitalizations (CIE 9-MC 650-669), and the sample includes 
all birth-related maternal hospitalizations in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the first 1 to 
4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 




Table 3.Week-by-week effects of benefit cancellation on the timing of births 
 
Dep. var. N. of births ln(n. births) N. of births ln(n. births) N. of births ln(n. births) 
       Nov. 13-19     
21.08 0.0158 
 
    
(18.92) (0.0141) 
Nov. 20-26     
31.69* 0.0240* 
 
    
(16.41) (0.0124) 
Nov. 27-Dec. 3   
23.94 0.0178 23.99 0.0181 
 
  
(17.75) (0.0130) (15.25) (0.0112) 
Dec. 4-10 5.32 0.0069 2.28 0.0049 2.29 0.0052 
 
(34.90) (0.0247) (34.75) (0.0248) (33.01) (0.0235) 
Dec. 11-17 48.35*** 0.0357*** 45.33*** 0.0337*** 45.38*** 0.0340*** 
 
(14.99) (0.0107) (15.12) (0.0108) (12.58) (0.0090) 
Dec. 18-24 66.13* 0.0465** 63.11* 0.0445** 63.16* 0.0448* 
 
(34.93) (0.0218) (34.93) (0.0218) (34.33) (0.0212) 
Dec. 25-31 162.30*** 0.1187*** 159.28*** 0.1167*** 159.33*** 0.1170*** 
 
(33.19) (0.0238) (33.42) (0.0238) (32.60) (0.0232) 
       Jan. 1-7 -119.78*** -0.0990*** -122.85*** -0.1010*** -122.94*** -0.1009*** 
 
(31.29) (0.0230) (30.64) (0.0227) (29.66) (0.0222) 
Jan. 8-14 -73.96*** -0.0593*** -76.98*** -0.0613*** -76.93*** -0.0610*** 
 
(20.71) (0.0162) (20.43) (0.0162) (17.80) (0.0143) 
Jan. 15-21 -66.17*** -0.0533*** -69.19*** -0.0552*** -69.14*** -0.0550*** 
 
(19.88) (0.0159) (20.11) (0.0162) (17.06) (0.0139) 
Jan. 22-28 -43.11*** -0.0334*** -46.14*** -0.0354*** -46.09*** -0.0351*** 
 
(16.05) (0.0114) (15.73) (0.0114) (13.40) (0.0095) 
Jan. 29-Feb. 4   
-29.05* -0.0207* -28.99** -0.0204* 
 
  
(16.75) (0.0124) (14.14) (0.0104) 
Feb. 4-11     
-31.33** -0.0230*** 
 
    
(12.35) (0.0086) 
Feb. 12-18     
-3.40 -0.0028 
 
    
(11.24) (0.0096) 
       N. of weeks 






(0.0161) (0.0145) (0.0133) 
 
       Sample Nov.27- Feb.4 Nov.20- Feb.11 Nov.6- Feb.25 
N 744 1008 1344 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Day of week d. Y Y Y 
Holiday d. Y Y Y 
Year*day of w. Y Y Y 
Day of year d. Y Y Y 
 
 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients on a set of four dummies for the last 4 weeks of December 2010, 
as well as four dummies for the initial 4 weeks of January 2011 (the period right around benefit 
cancellation). An observation is a day. The dependent variable is the (log) daily number of 
births. The reference weeks are Nov. 27-Dec. 3 and Jan. 29-Feb. 4 in the first two columns, 
Nov. 20-26 and Feb. 4-11 in the third and fourth columns, and Nov.6-12 and Feb. 19-25 in the 
last two columns.The sample includes all births in the sample weeks, from 2000-01 to 2011-12. 




Table 4.The effect of the benefit cancellation on the timing of births, individual-
level analysis 
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Baseline model 
        Reform 0.0534*** 0.0407*** 0.0325*** 0.0262*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
         
Model with interactions         
     Reform 0.0631*** 0.0542*** 0.0477*** 0.0355*** 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) 
     Reform* -0.0292*** -0.0201*** -0.0182*** -0.0135*** 
First birth (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
     Reform* -0.0229** -0.0191** -0.0141** -0.0092* 
Immigrant mom (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
     Reform* 0.0210** 0.0050 0.0030 0.0076 
Any parent university educated (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Reform* 0.0524* 0.0187 0.0244 0.0137 
Twins (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) 
     Reform* 0.0233* 0.0172* 0.0052 0.0057 
Mom under 25 (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
     Reform* 0.0157 0.0120* 0.0050 0.0081 
Mom over 35 (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
     Reform* -0.0014 -0.0081 -0.0089* -0.0095** 
Married mother (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
     Reform* 0.0178 0.0125 0.0191 0.0119 
No registered dad (0.031) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) 
     Reform* -0.0045 -0.0025 -0.0037 -0.0071 
High-skill mother (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
     Reform* -0.0018 0.0042 0.0048 0.0054 
Capital (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
     Reform* -0.0113 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0073 
Rural (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
     Reform* 0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0007 0.0031 
Girl (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
     N 87,677 180,451 273,625 363,396 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012. 
Note: Each column in the two sub-panels reports coefficients from equation (2). An observation is an 
individual birth. The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes value one if the birth happens in 
December. “Reform” is a binary explanatory variable taking value one if the birth occurs in December 
2010-January 2011 (the weeks right around benefit cancellation). Control variables include: mother and 
father’s age, mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, four sets of dummies 
for parental occupation and education, and dummies for first-borns, female babies, and multiple births, as 
well as province fixed-effects.The sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the 
first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs from 2007-08 to 
2011-12.Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses 
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Table 5. The effect of benefit cancellation on the timing of c-sections and birth 
complications, and the duration of maternal hospitalizations 
Panel A. Birth-certificate data +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
     Dep. var.: N. of births 119.48*** 81.26*** 61.97*** 46.91*** 
                  by caesarean section (37.737) (18.321) (14.196) (12.722) 
     N 70 140 210 280 
     Panel B. Hospital data +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
      Dep. var.: N. of c-sections 278.59*** 170.15*** 130.06*** 98.66*** 
           and other birthcomplications (39.17) (31.52) (24.23) (20.59) 
     Dep. var.: Av. duration of maternal 0.267*** 0.142** 0.058 -0.112 
               hospitalizations (Mean 3.4) (0.094) (0.057) (0.046) (0.074) 
     Dep. var.: Av. duration of hospitalizations  -0.012 -0.036 -0.015 -0.017 
               for normal deliveries (Mean 2.6) (0.066) (0.036) (0.029) (0.023) 
     Dep. var.: Av. duration of hospitalizations  0.366*** 0.198** 0.072 -0.182* 
for birth complications (Mean 3.7) (0.122) (0.078) (0.064) (0.109) 
     N 168 336 504 672 
     
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of week dummies Y Y Y Y 
Holiday dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week Y Y Y Y 
Day of year dummies Y Y Y Y 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012and 
Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010 dummy (the month right before benefit 
cancellation) fromequation (1). An observation is a day. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 
the daily number of births delivered by c-section and the sample includes births delivered by c-
section in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on 
the column), for December-January pairs from 2007-08 to 2010-12. In Panel B, the dependent 
variable is the number of maternal hospitalizations due to birth complications (CIE 9-MC 651-
669), its average duration in days, and the average duration of all birth-related maternal 
hospitalizations (CIE 9-MC 650-669) and hospitalizations due to normal deliveries (CIE 9-MC 
650), in days. The sample includes birth-related maternal hospitalizations in the last 1 to 4 
weeks of December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for 
December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-12. Robust standard errors are shown in 




Table 6. The effect of benefit cancellation on the incidence of c-sections and birth 
complications 
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Panel A.  Birth-certificate data 
Dep.var.: Indicator for c-section birth 0.0085 0.0025 0.0035 0.0018 
 
(0.0175) (0.0113) (0.0089) (0.0077) 
     N 180,020 365,983 550,976 735,142 
Demographic controls Y Y Y Y 
Panel B.  Hospital data 
Dep. var.: Indicator for c-sections and 0.0072 0.0045 0.0022 0.0033 
      other complications (Mean 0.779) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0026) 
     N 298,380 606,186 914,962 1,223,068 
Demographic controls (maternal age) Y Y Y Y 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012 and 
Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note:We report coefficients on a December 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) fromequation (3). In Panel A, an observation is an individual birth; the 
dependent variable is a dummy for C-section births; and control variables include: mother and 
father’s age, mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, two sets of 
dummies for parental occupation, dummies for first-borns, female babies, and multiple births, a 
linear time trend, year fixed effects, and province fixed-effects. The sample includes all births in 
the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and 
January (depending on the column), for October-November-December-January sets from 2007-
08 to 2011-12. In Panel B, an observation is a birth-related maternal hospitalization; the 
dependent variable is a dummy for birth-related complications (CIE 9-MC 651-669); and 
control variables include: maternal age, a binary indicator for all December-January births, and 
year fixed effects. The sample includes allbirth-related maternal hospitalizations (CIE 9-MC 
650-669) in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of 
November and January (depending on the column), from 2000-01 to 2011-12. Robust 




Table 7. The effect of benefit cancellation on birth-weight and mortality 
 
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Panel A. Birth weight 
     Dep. var.: Birth weight -14.7551*** -12.5092*** -5.5886* -3.6502 
 
(4.9610) (3.8661) (3.3656) (2.8978) 
     Dep. var.: Birth weight -0.0049*** -0.0045*** -0.0020* -0.0013 
                 (in logs) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
     Dep. var.: BW<1,500 0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 0.0003 
 
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
     Dep. var.: BW<2,500 0.0013 0.0014 0.0003 0.0005 
 
(0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
     Dep. var.: BW<2,750 0.0053 0.0035 0.0023 0.0021 
 
(0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0020) 
     Dep. var.: BW<3,000 0.0092* 0.0064* 0.0035 0.0030 
 
(0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0025) 
     Dep. var.: BW<3,500 0.0095** 0.0071** 0.0021 0.0021 
 
(0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0025) 
     N 397,505 809,882 1,220,263 1,627,681 
Panel B. Mortality 
     Dep. var.: Late fetal death 0.3748 0.4772 0.2393 0.2920 
                (per 1,000 births) (0.7716) (0.5039) (0.4151) (0.3515) 
     Dep. var.: Neonatal mortality  0.0094 0.2097 0.2071 0.0288 
(24 hours) (per 1,000 births) (0.3486) (0.2184) (0.1701) (0.1543) 
     N 418,539 852,606 1,283,972 1,712,552 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients on a December 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right 
around benefit cancellation) fromequation (4). An observation is an individual newborn baby. 
Control variables include: mother and father’s age, mother’s immigrant status and marital status, 
a dummy for urban areas, two sets of dummies for parental occupation, dummies for first-borns, 
female babies, and multiple births, a binary indicator for all December-January births, a linear 
time trend, year fixed effects, and a set of 50 province fixed-effects. In both panels, the sample 
includes all babies born in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 
weeks of November and January (depending on the column), for October-November-December-
January quadruplets from 2000-01 to 2011-12. Robust standard errors, clustered at the date 
level, are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 8. The effect of benefit cancellation on infant hospitalizations by age 
  +/- 1 weeks +/- 2 weeks +/- 3 weeks +/- 4 weeks 
Panel A. Hospitalization rates (per child) 
          
          Age <7 days 0.0027 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0020 
 
(0.0093) (0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0036) 
              Age 7-30 days (1 week to 1 month) 0.0060* 0.0073*** 0.0077*** 0.0067*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
              Age 31-59 days (1-2 months) 0.0061 0.0055* 0.0021 0.0010 
 
(0.0054) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
              Age 60-89 days (2-3 months) -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0011 
 
(0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
              Age 90-179 days (3-6 months) -0.0066 -0.0036 -0.0022 -0.0011 
 
(0.0046) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
              Age 180-364 days (6-12 months) -0.0028 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0005 
 
(0.0082) (0.0045) (0.0032) (0.0025) 
     Age 0-12 months 0.0035 0.0083 0.0072 0.0040 
 
(0.0250) (0.0133) (0.0095) (0.0079) 
              Age 365-1000 days (12-33 months) -0.0153 -0.0127 -0.0110* -0.0094* 
 
(0.0160) (0.0087) (0.0065) (0.0056) 
     Age 0-33 months -0.0117 -0.0044 -0.0038 -0.0054 
 
(0.0344) (0.0190) (0.0140) (0.0118) 
    N 336 672 1008 1344 
Panel B. Mortality rates (per 1,000 children) 
     Age 0-2 months 0.0710 0.1669 0.1800 -0.0033 
 
(0.6686) (0.4187) (0.3387) (0.2945) 
     Age 0-12 months 0.2976 0.2719 0.3382 0.0428 
 
(0.7000) (0.4539) (0.3724) (0.3305) 
     N 140 280 420 560 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data (2000-2014), birth-certificate micro data 
(2000-2013), and death-certificate micro data (2007-2013), Spanish National Statistical 
Institute. 
Note: We report coefficientsonaDecember 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) fromequation (5). An observation is a day (birth-date). The dependent 
variable is the number of overnight hospitalizations (Panel A) or the number of deaths times 
1,000 (Panel B) in a given age range of children born on a given day, divided by the number of 
children born on that day. Control variables include calendar month dummies, and year fixed 
effects. The sample includes all days in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the 
first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January (depending on the column), for October-November-




Table 9.The effect of benefit cancellation on hospitalizations by diagnosis and age 
 
Dep. var.: Hospitalization 
+/- 1 weeks +/- 2 weeks +/- 3 weeks +/- 4 weeks 
rate 
Panel A. Age 0-2 months          
Perinatal conditions 0.0083 0.0074 0.0058 0.0021 
 
(0.0098) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0037) 
       Perinatal infection 0.0011 0.0010 0.0014 0.0011 
 
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
Respiratory disease  0.0094* 0.0088** 0.0079*** 0.0063** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
       Bronchitis 0.0079* 0.0079** 0.0075*** 0.0059** 
 
(0.0048) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
Digestive problems -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Infectious diseases  0.0001 0.0008 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Panel B. Age 2-12 months         
Respiratory disease -0.0064 -0.0043 -0.0021 -0.0010 
 
(0.0054) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0021) 
       Bronchitis -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0003 
 
(0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
Digestive problems -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 
 
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
Infectious diseases -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0006 
 
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Panel C. Age 12-33 months         
Respiratory disease -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0022 
 
(0.0050) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
       Bronchitis 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 
 
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Digestive problems -0.0041 -0.0030* -0.0024* -0.0016 
 
(0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Infectious diseases  -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 
(0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Panel D. Age 0-33 months         
Respiratory disease (11.4%) 0.0017 0.0030 0.0037 0.0031 
 
(0.0119) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0044) 
       Bronchitis (6.5%) 0.0053 0.0066 0.0072** 0.0056* 
 
(0.0075) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0031) 
Digestive problems (3.0%) -0.0060 -0.0038 -0.0030 -0.0025 
 
(0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0017) 
Infectious diseases (2.9%) -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0014 
 
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
N 336 672 1008 1344 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data and birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National 
Statistical Institute, 2000-2013. Note: We report coefficients on a December 2010-January 2011 dummy 
(the weeks right around benefit cancellation) from equation (5).  An observation is a day (birth-date). The 
dependent variable is the number of overnight hospitalizations in a given age range and with a given 
diagnosis, of children born on a given day, divided by the number of children born on that day. Control 
variables include calendar month dummies, and year fixed effects. The sample includes all days in the last 
1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January (depending 
on the column), for October-November-December-January sets from 2000-01 to 2011-12. Standard errors 




Table 10.The effects of the benefit cancellation on bronchitis and asthma 
prevalence by age 
 
Dep. var.: Number of 
hospital stays 
Bronchitis, 
in levels   
Bronchitis, 
in logs   
Asthma, 
in levels   
Asthma, 
in logs   
          















































































                   
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 
2000-2013. 
Note: We report coefficients ona January-February 2011 dummy. An observation is a day. The 
dependent variable is the number of bronchitis (or asthma) hospitalizations (in levels or logs) 
that start on a given day, where the patient is in the specified age range (at release). Control 
variables include calendar month dummies, and turn-of-the-year fixed effects.The sample 
includes all days in November, December, January and February from 2000-01 to 2011-12 






































Table A1. Descriptive statistics (births in October-January,2000-01 to 2011-12) 
 
  Average Stdev. Min Max 
     Panel A. Health Outcomes at Birth 
    Birth weight 3.206 (540.3) 500 6500 
BW<1,500 0.0095 (0.097) 0 1 
BW<2,500 0.0805 (0.272) 0 1 
BW<3,000 0.2954 (0.456) 0 1 
BW<3,500 0.7089 (0.454) 0 1 
Mother's age 30.88 (5.334) 12 55 
Father's age 32.96 (7.284) 0 83 
No reported father 0.0176 (0.131) 0 1 
Married 0.7039 (0.457) 0 1 
Immigrant mother 0.1633 (0.370) 0 1 
First birth 0.5545 (0.497) 0 1 
Twins 0.0201 (0.140) 0 1 
Girl 0.4853 (0.500) 0 1 
Gestation weeks 39.1648 (1.586) 33 46 
Gestation weeks <37 0.0622 (0.241) 0 1 
Gestation weeks =37-38 0.2293 (0.420) 0 1 
Gestation weeks =39-40 0.5416 (0.498) 0 1 
Gestation weeks =41-42 0.1660 (0.372) 0 1 
Gestation weeks >42 0.0009 (0.030) 0 1 
Late fetal deaths (per 1,000 births) 3.2793 (57.171) 0 1 
Mortality within 24 hours (per 1,000 births) 0.6984 (26.418) 0 1 
     Panel B. Daily deaths over number of births  
    Mortality within first 2 months (per 1,000 births) 2.5066 (1.394) 0 7.6014
Mortality within first 12 months  (per 1,000 births) 3.2342 (1.567) 0 8.2645 
     Panel C. Hospital stays over number of births  
    Total hospitalization rates by age 
    Total, age 0-33 months 0.4383 (0.065) 0.2316 1.3861
Total, age 0-12 months 0.3301 (0.042) 0.1377 0.7710 
Age <7 days 0.1440 (0.019) 0.0296 0.2113 
Age 7-30 days 0.0343 (0.011) 0.0087 0.0862 
Age 31-59 days 0.0386 (0.013) 0.0015 0.1139 
Age 60-89 days 0.0265 (0.010) 0.0008 0.0708 
Age 90-179 days 0.0390 (0.012) 0.0112 0.1287 
Age 6-12 months 0.0477 (0.015) 0.0123 0.2196 
Age 12-33 months 0.1082 (0.031) 0.0468 0.6151 
2 Hospitalization rates by diagnosis and age 
    Perinatal conditions 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.1444 (0.019) 0.0258 0.2228
                    Age 0-2 months 0.1418 (0.019) 0.0229 0.2109 
       Perinatal infection 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.0100 (0.005) 0.0000 0.0510
                    Age 0-2 months 0.0099 (0.005) 0.0000 0.0510 
Respiratory disease 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.1138 (0.024) 0.0567 0.2609
                    Age 0-2 months 0.0355 (0.014) 0.0022 0.0891 
                    Age 2-12 months 0.0435 (0.014) 0.0059 0.1178 
                    Age 12-33 months 0.0348 (0.010) 0.0136 0.0956 
       Bronchitis 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.0649 (0.018) 0.0171 0.1486
                    Age 0-2 months 0.0283 (0.013) 0.0011 0.0804 
                    Age 2-12 months 0.0276 (0.012) 0.0011 0.0736 
                    Age 12-33 months 0.0090 (0.004) 0.0008 0.0349 
Digestive problems 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.0304 (0.011) 0.0090 0.1641
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                    Age 0-2 months 0.0041 (0.003) 0.0000 0.0388 
                    Age 2-12 months 0.0127 (0.005) 0.0025 0.0470 
                    Age 12-33 months 0.0135 (0.007) 0.0015 0.1133 
Infectious diseases 
                        All ages, 0-33 months  0.0294 (0.008) 0.0082 0.0761
                    Age 0-2 months 0.0052 (0.003) 0.0000 0.0303 
                    Age 2-12 months 0.0114 (0.005) 0.0010 0.0582 
                    Age 12-33 months 0.0128 (0.005) 0.0023 0.0329 
 
Sources: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012 (Panel 
A), death-certificate micro data, 2007-2013 (Panel B), and Hospital Morbidity Survey, 2000-
2013 (Panel C).  
Note: The sample includes all births in the last 4 weeks of October and December and the first 4 
weeks of November and January, for years 2000-01 (2007-08 for mortality) to 2011-12. The 
unit of observation is the birth (including multiple births) for gestational age outcomes, the 
childfor birth-weight and mortality outcomes, and the day (birth-date) for the hospitalization 
variables outcomes. The total number of observations (individual babies) is 1,712,552(there are 







Table A2. The effect of benefit cancellation on the timing of births: Alternative 
specifications 
 
Panel A. Birth-certificate data (+/-1 week) 1 2 3 4 
          
Dep. var.: Number of births 280.08*** 282.88*** 280.57*** 289.90*** 
 
(61.469) (59.975) (41.711) (43.522) 
Number of births moved 980 990 982 1015 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of births) 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.044) (0.040) (0.030) (0.028) 
Share of births moved 11% 12% 11% 12% 
     Panel B. Hospital data (+/-1 week) 1 2 3 4 
     Dep. var.: Number of maternal  334.98*** 339.25*** 315.92*** 335.81*** 
hospitalizations  (66.70) (74.85) (43.90) (47.40) 
Number of births moved 1172 1187 1106 1175 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of maternal hosp.) 0.388*** 0.394*** 0.359*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.075) (0.081) (0.056) (0.065) 
Share of births moved 21% 22% 20% 21% 
     N 168 168 168 168 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of week dummies Y Y Y Y 
Holiday dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week N Y N Y 
Day of year dummies N N Y Y 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012, and 
Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010 dummy (the month right before benefit 
cancellation) from equation (1).An observation is a day. In Panel A, the dependent variable is 
the (log) daily number of births, and the sample includes all births in the last week of December 
or the first week of January, for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-12. In Panel B, 
the dependent variable is the (log) daily number of birth-related maternal hospitalizations (CIE 
9-MC 650-669), and the sample includes all birth-related maternal hospitalizations in the last 
week of December and the first week of January, for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 





Table A3. The effect of benefit cancellation on the timing of births, 2007-2012 
sample 
 
Panel A. Birth-certificate data +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
          
Dep. var.: Number of births 285.56*** 206.82*** 168.27*** 134.44*** 
 
(49.165) (31.172) (24.612) (22.451) 
Number of births moved 999 1448 1767 1882 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of births) 0.219*** 0.158*** 0.129*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.034) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) 
Share of births moved 12% 8% 7% 5% 
          
Panel B. Hospital data +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
     Dep. var.: Number of maternal  201.91*** 157.81*** 129.41*** 105.78*** 
hospitalizations  (42.64) (26.12) (22.87) (19.52) 
Number of births moved 707 1105 1359 1481 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of maternal  0.203*** 0.161*** 0.133*** 0.108*** 
hospitalizations) (0.038) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) 
Share of births moved 11% 8% 7% 6% 
          
N 70 140 210 280 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of week dummies Y Y Y Y 
Holiday dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week Y Y Y Y 
Day of year dummies Y Y Y Y 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012, and 
Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010 dummy (the month right before benefit 
cancellation)from equation (1).An observation is a day. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
(log) daily number of births, and the sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of 
December or the first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-
January pairs from 2007-08 to 2011-12. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the (log) daily 
number of birth-related maternal hospitalizations (CIE 9-MC 650-669), and the sample includes 
all birth-related maternal hospitalizations in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the first 1 to 
4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs from 2007-08 to 





Table A4. Fertility effects of the benefit cancellation  
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Dep. var.: Number of births -5.39 -21.79 -30.27 -40.7** 
 
(50.19) (27.31) (20.07) (16.07) 
     Dep. var.: ln(number of births) -0.0093 -0.0203 -0.0266* -0.0331*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0205) (0.0151) (0.0121) 
     N 336 672 1008 1344 
Yeardummies Y Y Y Y 
Monthdummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of weekdummies Y Y Y Y 
Holidaydummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week Y Y Y Y 
Day of yeardummies Y Y Y Y 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation)from the following regression: Bjt=  + Dec2010-Jan2011jt + dw + dy+ h 
+ t + jt, where B is the (log) number of births taking place on day j of year t and the main 
explanatory variable is a dummy that takes value 1 for December 2010-January 2011 births. An 
observation is a day. The sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and 
December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January (depending on the column), for 
October-November-December-January quadruplets from 2000-01 to 2011-12. Robust standard 






Table A5. The effect of the benefit cancellation on gestation length 
 
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Panel A. Daily-level analysis 
     Dep. var.: N. of births <37 weeks 16.0409*** 11.5745*** 10.0771*** 8.0175*** 
 
(4.3239) (3.1953) (2.8430) (2.3846) 
     Dep. var.: N. of births 37-38 weeks 73.7596*** 52.8614*** 39.4982*** 32.5832*** 
 
(16.7676) (11.6337) (8.7697) (7.6339) 
     Dep. var.: N. of births 39-40 weeks 122.2551*** 92.1499*** 80.9057*** 67.2842*** 
 
(17.3428) (13.8019) (10.6833) (9.6879) 
     Dep. var.: N. of births 41-42 weeks 25.9215*** 17.3746*** 12.8240*** 11.2284*** 
 
(5.4576) (6.0936) (4.6368) (3.9583) 
     Dep. var.: N. of births >42 weeks 0.1701 0.4533 0.2321 0.2493 
 
(0.5482) (0.3793) (0.2867) (0.2424) 
     N 168 336 504 672 
Panel B. Individual-level analysis 
     Dep. var: Gestation weeks  -0.0509** -0.0362** -0.0300** -0.0251** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0117) 
          N 165228 341161 518185 689240 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Day of week dummies Y Y Y Y 
Holiday dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year*day of week Y Y Y Y 
Day of year dummies Y Y Y Y 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012.Note: 
We report coefficients ona December 2010dummy (the month right before benefit cancellation). 
In Panel A the regression is equation (1) in the text, an observation is a day, and the dependent 
variable is the number of daily births for different gestation durations. The sample includes all 
births (by gestational length) in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of 
January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-12. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Panel B, the equation is offered in footnote 
22, an observation is an individual birth, and the dependent variable is gestation length 
measured in weeks. Control variables include: an indicator for all December births, mother and 
father’s age, mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, two sets of 
dummies for parental occupation, dummies for first-borns, female babies, and multiple births, 
and province fixed effects. The sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December 
and the first 1 to 4 weeks of January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs 




Table A6. The effect of benefit cancellation on birth timing, by availability of 
private health centers in the province 
 







     Reform*Private maternity beds per 1,000 0.0824** 0.1146*** 0.1264*** 0.1165*** 
females aged 15-44 in province (0.0397) (0.0393) (0.0396) (0.0362) 
     Reform*Private beds per  0.0212** 0.0232** 0.0227** 0.0224** 
1,000 inhabitants in province (0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0092) 
     Reform*Private beds over  0.0876** 0.0887** 0.0838** 0.0819** 
total hospital beds in province (0.0414) (0.0374) (0.0347) (0.0344) 
     N 198,318 409,408 621,056 825,449 
Province fixed effects? Y Y Y Y 
All interactions? (between “Reform” and 
controls) Y Y Y Y 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute (2000-2012),  
National Catalogue of Hospitals, Spanish Ministry of Health (2000-2012), and population by 
province (2000-2012), Spanish National Statistical Institute. 
Note:We report coefficients onthe interaction between “Reform”, a binary explanatory variable 
taking value one if the birth occurs in December 2010-January 2011 (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation), and the availability of private health centers in the province from equation 
(2). An observation is an individual birth. The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes 
value one if the birth occurs in December. Control variables include: mother and father’s age, 
mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, two sets of dummies for 
parental occupation, and dummies for first-borns, female babies, and multiple births. The 
sample includes all births in the last 1 to 4 weeks of December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of 
January (depending on the column), for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 2011-





Table A7. The effect of benefit cancellation on birth-weight, 2007-2012 sample 
 
  +/-1 week +/-2 weeks +/-3 weeks +/-4 weeks 
Dep. var.: Birth weight -14.3777*** -10.7014** -3.5703 -2.0724 
 
(5.3420) (4.1967) (3.6412) (3.1183) 
     Dep. var.: Birth weight -0.0050** -0.0039** -0.0014 -0.0008 
                 (in logs) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
     Dep. var.: BW<1,500 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 0.0001 
 
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
     Dep. var.: BW<2,500 0.0016 0.0008 0.0002 0.0004 
 
(0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
     Dep. var.: BW<2,750 0.0062 0.0036 0.0022 0.0020 
 
(0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0021) 
     Dep. var.: BW<3,000 0.0095* 0.0074* 0.0036 0.0029 
 
(0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0027) 
     Dep. var.: BW<3,500 0.0105** 0.0063* 0.0006 0.0006 
 
(0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0026) 
     N 175,823 357,968 539,044 719,402 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2007-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients ona December 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) from equation (4). Control variables include: mother and father’s age, 
mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, two sets of dummies for 
parental occupation, dummies for first-borns, female babies, and multiple births, a binary 
indicator for all December-January births, a linear time trend, year fixed effects, and a set of 50 
province fixed-effects. The sample includes all babies born in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October 
and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January (depending on the column), 
for October-November-December-January quadruplets from 2007-08 to 2011-12. Robust 




Table A8. The effect of benefit cancellation on infant hospitalizations by age, 2007-
2012 sample 
 
Dep. var.: Hospitalization 
+/- 1 weeks +/- 2 weeks +/- 3 weeks +/- 4 weeks 
rate 
          
          Age <7 days -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0038* 
 
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
              Age 7-30 (1 week to 1 month) 0.0037 0.0049*** 0.0053*** 0.0051*** 
 
(0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
              Age 31-59 days (1-2 months) 0.0089* 0.0090*** 0.0066*** 0.0062*** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
              Age 60-89 days (2-3 months) 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0002 
 
(0.0035) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
              Age 90-179 days (3-6 months) -0.0051* -0.0036* -0.0034** -0.0029** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
              Age 180-364 days (6-12 months) 0.0003 0.0012 0.0018 0.0010 
 
(0.0051) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0018) 
     Age 0-12 months 0.0054 0.0083 0.0074 0.0058 
 
(0.0148) (0.0085) (0.0066) (0.0057) 
              Age 365-1000 days (12-33 months) -0.0077 -0.0102** -0.0105** -0.0089** 
 
(0.0089) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
     Age 0-33 months -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0031 
 
(0.0189) (0.0111) (0.0086) (0.0076) 
    N 140 280 420 560 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data and birth-certificate micro data, Spanish 
National Statistical Institute, 2007-2013. 
Note: We report coefficients on aDecember 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) fromequation (5). An observation is a day (birth-date). The dependent 
variable is the number of overnight hospitalizations in a given age range of children born on a 
given day, divided by the number of children born on that day. Control variables include 
calendar month dummies, and year fixed effects.The sample includes all days in the last 1 to 4 
weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January 
(depending on the column), for October-November-December-January sets from 2007-08 to 




Table A9. The effect of benefit cancellation on hospitalizations by diagnosis and 
age, 2007-2012 sample 
 
Dep. var.: Hospitalization 
+/- 1 weeks +/- 2 weeks +/- 3 weeks +/- 4 weeks 
rate 
Age 0-2 months          
Perinatal conditions -0.0008 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0012 
 
(0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0024) 
       Perinatal infection -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Respiratory disease 0.0147*** 0.0132*** 0.0119*** 0.0105*** 
 
(0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
       Bronchitis 0.0119*** 0.0111*** 0.0103*** 0.0092*** 
 
(0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Digestive problems  -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Infectious disease 0.0002 0.0012* 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Age 2-12 months         
Respiratory disease -0.0042 -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.0013 
 
(0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
       Bronchitis -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 
(0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
Digestive problems -0.0010 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 
 
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Infectious diseases -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0014* -0.0008 
 
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Age 12-33 months         
Respiratory disease -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0015 
 
(0.0043) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
       Bronchitis 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0007 
 
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Digestive problems  -0.0029* -0.0026** -0.0024*** -0.0015** 
 
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Infectious diseases  -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008 
 
(0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Age 0-33 months         
Respiratory disorders (11.4%) 0.0104 0.0091 0.0088** 0.0077* 
 
(0.0098) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0041) 
       Bronchitis (6.5%) 0.0111* 0.0102*** 0.0099*** 0.0079*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0029) 
Digestive problems (3.0%) -0.0044 -0.0033* -0.0033** -0.0024** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0012) 
Infectious diseases (2.9%) -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0013 
 
(0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
N 140 280 420 560 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data and birth-certificate micro data, Spanish 
National Statistical Institute, 2007-2013. 
Note: We report coefficients on aDecember 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) fromequation (5).  An observation is a day (birth-date). The dependent 
variable is the number of overnight hospitalizations in a given age range and with a given 
diagnosis, of children born on a given day, divided by the number of children born on that day. 
We show the results for the main group(s) (chapters) of diagnoses, and the main single (three-
digit) diagnosis, in each age range. Control variables include calendar month dummies, and year 
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fixed effects. The sample includes all days in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December 
and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January (depending on the column), for October-





Table A10. The effect of benefit cancellation on hospitalizations: Robustness 
checks 
 
Dep. var.: Hospitalization 
+/- 1 weeks +/- 2 weeks +/- 3 weeks +/- 4 weeks 
rate, age 0-2 months 
Panel A. Dropping Madrid residents         
Respiratory disease 0.0110* 0.0103*** 0.0093*** 0.0074*** 
 
(0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0025) 
        Bronchitis 0.0092* 0.0092*** 0.0088*** 0.0069*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
Panel B. Controlling for flu incidence         
Respiratory disease 0.0092* 0.0086*** 0.0076*** 0.0060*** 
 
(0.0048) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0022) 
        Bronchitis 0.0080* 0.0079*** 0.0073*** 0.0057*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
Panel C. Adding March and February as control months     
Respiratory disease 0.0059 0.0072*** 0.0068*** 0.0057*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
        Bronchitis 0.0053 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0051*** 
 
(0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Panel D. Controlling for benefit eligibility       
Respiratory disease 0.0112* 0.0105*** 0.0097*** 0.0077*** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0026) 
        Bronchitis 0.0088 0.0090*** 0.0086*** 0.0066*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0024) 
(*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
Data sources: Hospital Morbidity Survey micro data and birth-certificate micro data, Spanish 
National Statistical Institute, 2000-2013. 
Note: We report coefficients on aDecember 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) fromequation (5).An observation is a day (birth-date). The dependent 
variable is the number of overnight hospitalizations at age 0 to 59 days with a given diagnosis, 
of children born on a given day, divided by the number of children born on that day. Control 
variables include calendar month dummies, and year fixed effects. The sample includes all days 
in the last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and 
January (depending on the column), for October-November-December-January sets from 2000-






Table A11. The effects of the benefit cancellation on the timing of births by 





Additional Births per 
Hospital 
Additional Births per 100 
Beds 
Panel A. Top 10 percent in the distribution of Additional Births per Hospital 
Almería 4.262 *** 0.474 0.286 




Huelva 3.133 ** 0.627 0.256 




          
Panel B. Averages 





2.793   0.206 0.079 
     
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data sources: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012, and 
National Catalogue of Hospitals, Spanish Ministry of Health, 2000-2012. 
Note: In the first column, we report coefficients on December 2010 dummy (the month before 
benefit cancellation) from equation (1),where an observation is a day, and the dependent 
variable is the daily number of births in each province. The sample includes all births in the last 
week of December and the first week of January, for December-January pairs from 2000-01 to 
2011-12.The second and third columns divide the estimated province effects in column 1 by the 
corresponding number of hospitals in the province and the number of hospital beds in the 




Table A12. The effect of benefit cancellation on birth-weight and mortality, 











Panel A. Birth Weight Outcomes 
     Dep. var.: Birth weight -15.06** -14.19*** -6.51* -4.65 
 
(6.5371) (4.6154) (3.7856) (3.3048) 
     Dep. var.: Birth weight -0.0036 -0.0040** -0.0017 -0.0012 
                 (in logs) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0012) 
     Dep. var.: BW<1,500 -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
     Dep. var.: BW<2,500 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0007 
 
(0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
     Dep. var.: BW<3,000 0.0112** 0.0086** 0.0051 0.0043 
 
(0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0028) 
          N 397,505 809,882 1,220,263 1,627,681 
Panel B. Mortality Outcomes 
     Dep. var.: Late fetal death -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 
                (per 1,000 births) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
     Dep. var.: Neonatal mortality (24 
hours) -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 
                (per 1,000 births) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
     N 418,539 852,606 1,283,972 1,712,552 
 (*** 99%, ** 95%, * 90%) 
 
Data source: Birth-certificate micro data, Spanish National Statistical Institute, 2000-2012. 
Note: We report coefficients on December 2010-January 2011 dummy (the weeks right around 
benefit cancellation) from equation (4). An observation is an individual newborn baby. Control 
variables include: an indicator for benefit eligibility (October 2007-December 2010 births), 
mother and father’s age, mother’s immigrant status and marital status, a dummy for urban areas, 
two sets of dummies for parental occupation, dummies for first-borns, female babies, and 
multiple births, a binary indicator for all December-January births, a linear time trend, year 
fixed effects, and a set of 50 province fixed-effects. The sample includes all babies born in the 
last 1 to 4 weeks of October and December and the first 1 to 4 weeks of November and January 
(depending on the column), for October-November-December-January quadruplets from 2000-
01 to 2011-12. Robust standard errors, clustered at the date level, are shown in parentheses. 
 
